本研究以 2008 年至 2025 年間共 1,202 筆併購宣告事件為樣本，探討台灣上市櫃公司在進行併購決策時，股利發放政策與合約簽署狀態如何影響管理層根據市場股價反應調整決策的行為。
實證結果顯示，在未受股利紀律約束且尚未簽署正式合約的公司中，管理層對市場負面訊號展現出顯著的學習與撤回敏感度，支持市場回饋假說在台灣市場的適用性。然而，股利發放政策的影響與原先預期方向相反。實證發現，配息公司管理層的撤回決策對宣告期股價反應幾乎不敏感，無論市場給予正面或負面評價，撤回機率均未顯著改變，顯示股利發放所形塑的嚴格事前財務紀律，替代了管理層對宣告後外部市場訊號的依賴。此外，正式合約的簽署會形成顯著的退出阻力，龐大的違約成本使管理層即便面臨市場負面評價，仍難以依據市場回饋撤回交易。上述結論在替換事件窗口與估計模型後均保持穩健。
本研究首度探討台灣上市櫃公司併購撤回決策中的管理層學習行為，並將股利政策與合約約束納入市場學習框架，就內部財務紀律與外部交易摩擦如何共同影響管理層的市場訊號處理行為，提供來自台灣市場的實證視角。

Using a sample of 1,202 M&A announcements from Taiwanese listed companies between 2008 and 2025, this study examines how dividend policy and contracting status shape managerial responsiveness to market price signals in acquisition decisions.
For firms unconstrained by dividend discipline and without definitive agreements, managers exhibit significant sensitivity to negative market signals, supporting the applicability of the market feedback hypothesis in Taiwan. However, the effect of dividend policy contradicts initial expectations: the withdrawal decisions of dividend-paying acquirers are largely insensitive to announcement-period stock price reactions, suggesting that the strict ex ante financial discipline shaped by dividend payouts substitutes for managers' reliance on ex post external market signals. Additionally, the signing of a definitive agreement creates substantial cancellation costs, making it difficult for managers to withdraw based on market feedback even when facing negative market evaluations. These conclusions remain robust across alternative event windows and estimation models.
This study is the first to explore managerial learning in M&A withdrawal decisions among Taiwanese listed companies. By incorporating dividend policy and contractual constraints into the market learning framework, it provides new empirical evidence on how internal financial discipline and external transaction frictions jointly shape managers' processing of market signals.

張志豪（2024）。股利成長與風險值（VaR）指標的投資組合表現研究：以台灣股市為例。國立臺灣師範大學高階經理人企業管理碩士在職專班（EMBA）碩士論文。
詹錦宏、林明薰、溫秀英（2017）。台灣上市公司的股利政策與企業價值。會計學報，7（2），65–94。
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