國家的強制權力創造了龐大的租利(rent)。個人或團體往往投入時間、金

錢或其他努力以獲取這些租利；這些追逐爭利的過程，稱為「競租活動

」。研究這些租利的形成、尋求、防禦、規避及它對社會產生的成本、效

益的一些理論及實證分析，統稱為「競租理論」(theory of rent-seek-

ing)。本文將運用「利益團體模型」及「競租理論模型」將利益團體－管

制政策－社會福利成本三者之間的關係串聯起來。最後以Mohammad與

Walley對印度競租成本估計模式為架構，以台灣現有資料做一估計，探究

台灣因管制活動造成社會福利成本究竟有多大。本文共分五章。第一章緒

論；第二章為政治決策與競租活動；第三章為競租理論與福利成本之估計

（一）；第四章為競租成本的衡量（二）；第五章為結論及建議。

參考文獻
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