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| 研究生： |
陳怡君 |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
社會規範與最適移轉之研究 |
| 指導教授： | 吳家恩 |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
社會科學學院 - 財政學系 Department of Public Finance |
| 論文出版年： | 2006 |
| 畢業學年度： | 94 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 40 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 社會規範 、最適移轉 、勞動供給 、道德危機 |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：79 下載：48 |
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本文探討社會規範影響個人的勞動供給以及政府的最適移轉決策。利用效用函數分析個人勞動供給決策而得到以下的結果，在考慮社會規範的情況下，政府移轉造成個人勞動供給減少的幅度較小，所以社會規範具有提升個人勞動供給的誘因。除此之外，給付金額或所得稅稅率的增加，會降低個人的勞動供給。
為了兼顧移轉計畫的公平與效率目標，本文將個人的勞動供給決策放入社會福利函數加以考量，利用極大化社會福利函數以決定政府的最適移轉與所得稅稅率。結果發現，社會規範的強度增強，造成領取給付的人數比例下降，所以在政府移轉支出固定下，每位領取給付者的最適移轉金額提高。另外，考慮工作者有利他動機與道德危機的影響，發現工作者有利他動機時，個人的勞動供給會增加；道德危機增加時，個人的勞動供給隨之減少。政府則可以透過教育改變個人的行為，加以提升社會規範的強度，進而影響個人的勞動供給決策。
第一章 緒論...............................................1
1.1 研究背景與動機........................................1
1.2 研究目的.............................................3
1.3 研究方法與限制........................................3
1.4 研究架構.............................................4
第二章 社會規範在文獻中的探討...............................6
2.1 社會規範的形成原因....................................6
2.2 社會規範對勞動供給的影響...............................7
2.3 社會規範和道德危機的關係...............................9
第三章 社會規範對個人勞動供給的影響.........................11
3.1 基本模型.............................................11
3.2 Cobb-Douglas效用函數.................................14
3.3 CES效用函數..........................................16
第四章 社會規範對政府最適移轉的影響.........................19
4.1 最適移轉模型.........................................19
4.2 Cobb-Douglas效用函數.................................20
4.3 CES效用函數..........................................21
第五章 工作者的利他行為與道德危機之影響......................24
5.1 工作者有利他動機......................................24
5.1.1 Cobb-Douglas效用函數...............................24
5.1.2 CES效用函數........................................26
5.2 道德危機.............................................28
第六章 結論與延伸.........................................29
6.1 結論................................................29
6.2 延伸................................................30
參考文獻.................................................32
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