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| 研究生： |
林靜怡 |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
水平式合併之廠商獲利性與福利效果 |
| 指導教授： | 林柏生 |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
商學院 - 國際經營與貿易學系 Department of International Business |
| 論文出版年： | 2006 |
| 畢業學年度： | 94 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 55 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 水平式合併 、open-loop策略 、closed-loop memoryless策略 、feedback策略 |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：124 下載：110 |
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本文採用數值模擬的方式，在價格具僵固性的無窮期動態Cournot模型中，探討水平式合併對廠商獲利能力及社會總福利的影響。可以發現不論市場價格調整速度的快慢，當廠商採取open-loop策略時，加入合併的廠商家數佔總產業比例必須達到某個水準，合併才會有利可圖。如果廠商使用feedback或closed-loop memoryless策略，則不論合併的廠商家數多寡，合併都能使廠商獲利。然而無論合併是否能為廠商帶來更多的利潤，只要市場上發生水平式合併，必然造成社會福利的損失。
第一章 導論 3
第二章 模型設定 7
第一節 二次線性動態Cournot競爭模型 7
第二節 open-loop、closed-loop memoryless及
feedback策略與均衡之差異 9
第三章 靜態均衡與open-loop、feedback策略均衡 13
第一節 靜態Cournot均衡 13
第二節 open-loop策略均衡 16
第三節 feedback策略均衡 19
第四章 closed-loop memoryless策略均衡 25
第一節 合併前之closed-loop memoryless策略均衡 25
第二節 合併後之closed-loop memoryless策略均衡 27
第五章 水平式合併策略均衡之結果分析 32
第一節 水平式合併之廠商獲利性 32
第二節 水平式合併之福利效果 40
第六章 結論與建議 45
附錄 47
附錄一、合併後之stationary open-loop Nash equilibrium 47
附錄二、合併後之stationary feedback-perfect Nash equilibrium 50
參考文獻 54
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