本研究深入探討企業債務專一化和債務期限之決定因素，並以1980至2020年間的Capital IQ和Compustat資料庫為分析樣本。實證結果支持了資產負債匹配理論、破產成本理論，以及資訊不對稱對於債務結構的影響。更重要的是，本研究初步揭示出企業債務專一化與資產專一化間的正相關性，這可能源自企業為了滿足特定業務需求或風險管理策略，而選擇與其主要資產類型相匹配的債務工具。此外，我們也發現債務期限與債務專一化、資產期限以及資產專一化之間存在相互關聯，且有進行資產負債匹配之公司，其資產波動度降低，顯示企業在制定資本結構策略時應綜合考慮以上因素並作匹配管理，以提高風險管理能力並適應商業環境的變化。

This study delves into the determinants of corporate debt specificity and maturity, utilizing data from the Capital IQ and Compustat databases from 1980 to 2020. Empirical results support the influence of asset-liability matching principle, bankruptcy cost theory and information asymmetry on debt structure. Importantly, our research initially revealed the positive correlation between corporate debt specificity and asset specificity. This might be due to the company's choice of debt instruments matching its main asset types to meet specific business requirements or risk management strategies.
In addition, we found the relationship among debt maturity, debt specificity, asset maturity and asset specificity. Companies that engage in asset-liability matching principle demonstrate reduced asset volatility, suggesting that when formulating capital structure strategies, businesses should comprehensively consider these factors and perform matching management to enhance their risk management capabilities and adapt to changes in the business environment.

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