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| 研究生： |
張裕銘 |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
運用代理理論在審計契約行為上之研究 |
| 指導教授： | 鄭丁旺 |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
商學院 - 會計學系 Department of Accounting |
| 論文出版年： | 1988 |
| 畢業學年度： | 76 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：124 下載：0 |
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論文提要內容:
本研究旨在運用代理理論以瞭解審計之供給與需求之原因及條件。分析審計之價值，以及法律責任對審計行為的誘因效果。
本研究首先簡介代理理論之內容，並批評其缺陷與限制。其次整理代理理論在審計方面之文獻，以瞭解審計需求發生之背景原因，以及審計供給之條件。本研究指出唯有維持專業道德及會計師法律責任，審計人員才能獲得報表使用者的信賴，專業才有發展。本研究亦以簡單之靜態分析審計價值與事務所規模之關連。
本研究最後以Wansuk Mattew之模式為範本，分析審計人員的法律責任。本研究指出，嚴格的法律責任可以改善現存之不標準審計，但卻會造成整體審計品質之低落或審計公費之提高。
目錄
第一章 緒論………1
第一節 研究動機與目的………1
第二節 研究範圍………2
第三節 研究方法與限制………3
第四節 論文架構………3
第二章 代理理論………5
第一節 財產權理論………5
第二節 代理問題………9
第三節 基本代理模型………15
第四節 代理模型之缺失與代理理論的限制………20
第五節 本章彙述………25
第三章 審計需求………30
第一節 審計的發生………30
第二節 審計需求與財務資訊之重要性………41
第三節 審計價值、審計努力與事務所規模之分析………51
第四節 本章彙述………64
第四章 審計人員之誘因及其法律責任………73
第一節 有關法律責任之研究………74
第二節 模型之建立與假設………78
第三節 個別決策行為………83
第四節 行為分析………92
第五章 結論………115
第一節 結論與建議………115
第二節 未來研究方向之建議………118
參考書目………120
圖表目次
圖表3-1 審計機率樹………54
圖表3-2 審計努力之需求曲綫………55
圖表3-3 P_m(P_A2)曲綫………60
圖表3-4 事務所規模對管理說謊之影響………61
圖表4-1 法律責任制………76
圖表4-2 f(z/x)之三度間圖………81
圖表4-3 本人之決策樹………87
圖表4-4 制式與混合均衡………97
參考書目
一、中文書籍
1.石齊平著:當代個體經濟學理論與應用，自行出版，民國74年元月。
2.Robert Albanese; David D. Van Fleet: Organizational Behavior: A Managerial Viewpoint, CBS College Publishing，1983，吳定等譯，天一出版。
3.Meigs W. B.; O. R. Whittington; R. F. Meigs : Principles of Auditing(1985)8ed，馮拙人譯(台北:大中國圖書公司，民國74年7月)。
4.ALPHA C. Chiang: Fundamenta1 Methods of Mathematical Economics 2ed李嘉淦譯:基礎經濟數學，上下冊，(國立編譯館主編，東華書局出版，民國72年1月3版。)
5.馬忠芳著:一般財務審計報告之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文，民國64年1月。
6.陳耀連著:現代審計成長與專業會計制度之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文，民國66年7月。
7.王金來著:應用代理理論建立均衡參與預算模式之研究。國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文，民國74年6月。
8.陳惠玲著:資訊不對稱情況下之轉撥計價。國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文。民國74年6月。
9.李長聯著:會計師對財務報表使用者法律責任之研究。國立政治大學會計研究所，碩士論文。民國75年6月。
二、英文書籍:
1. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. A.(台北，天一出版，民國74.年)。
2. Amir Barnea, Robert A. Haugen and Lemma W. Senbet: Agency Problems and Financial Contracting, Prentice Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, U.S.A. 1985.
3. Antle Ricky Lee: Moral Hazard and Auditor Contracts: An Approach to Auditors' Legal Liability and Independence. Ph.D. dissertation, Standford University, 1981.
4. Carmichael D.R. and John J. Willingham: Perspectives in Auditing 4 ed, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1985.
5. Evans J. : Economic Models of Auditors‘ in the Accountability Environment, Ph.D. dissertation, Cornegie-Mellon, University, 1979.
6. John J. Willinghan, and D.R. Camichael: Auditing Concepts and Methods, 2ed McGraw-Hill, New York, 1974.
7. Ko Wansuk Matthew: Auditors' Incentive, Legal Liability and Reputation Under Information Asymmetry, Ph.D, dissertation, Ohio State University, 1985.
8. Magee R. : Employment Contracts and Accounting: The Auditor as an Economic Agent, Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1977.
9. Noel J . C. : Agency Costs and the Demand and Supply of Auditing , Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1981.
10. Richard E.J. , Darrell L.M. and A. Schmitz: Applied Welfare Economics and Public Policy , (台北，華泰翻印，民國72年)。
三、英文期刊：
1. Akerlot J. "The Market for 'Lemons : Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism". Quarterly Journal of Economics , August, 1970, PP. 488-500.
2. Alchion Armem A., and Demsetz Harold: "Production, Information Costs, and Economics Organization", American Economic Review LX11, NO. 5, Dec. 1972, PP. 777-795.
3, Anthony A. Atkinson: "Standard Setting In An Agency" Management Science, Vol. 24, No. 13, Sept. 1978, PP. 1350-1361.
4. Bengt Holmstrom: "Moral hazard and observability" The Bell Journal of Economics , Spring 1979, PP. 74-91.
5. Brown, J. "Toward an Economic Theory of Liability", Journal of Legal Studies, June 1973, PP. 323-349.
6, Dana Simunic: "The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence" Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring, 1980, PP. 161-189.
7, David S. Ng: "An Information Economics Analysis of Financial Reporting and External Auditing", The Accounting Review. Vol. L111, No. 4, Oct. 1978, PP. 910-920.
8. David S. Ng and Jan Stoeckenius "Auditing: Incentives and Truthful Reporting" Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 17, Supplement 1979 PP. 1-29.
9, Donald M. Roberts: "Discussion of Auditing: Incentives and Truthful Reporting" Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 17,Supplement 1979, PP. 30-32.
10. Douglas V. Dejong and John H. Smith: "The Determination of Audit Responsibilities: An Application of Agency Theory". Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 4, No. 1, Fall 1984.
11. Eugene F. Fama: "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm" Journal of Political Economy, April 1980, PP. 288-307.
12. Froystein Gjesdal: "Accounting for Stewardship" Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 1981, PP. 208-231..
13. Furubotn E.G. and S. Pejovich "Property rights and Economics theory: A survey of recent literature", Journal of Economic Literature X, Dec. 1972, PP. 1137-1162.
14. Harris M. and A. Raviv: "Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information", Journal of Economic Theory 20(1979), PP- 231-259.
15. Joel S. Demski and-R.J. Swieringa “A Cooperative Formulation of the Audit Choice Problem" The Accounting Review, July 1974, PP. 506-513.
16. Joel S. Demski and Gerald A. Feltham: "Economic Incentives in Budgetary Control Systems" The Accounting Review Vol. L111, No. 2, April 1978 PP. 336-359.
17. John H. Evans III: "Optimal Contracts. with Costly Conditional Auditing" Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 18, Supplement 1980, PP. 108-128.
18. Joseph E. Stiglitz: "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes towards a Theory of Hierarchy" The Bell Journal of Economics, Autumn 1975, PP.552-579.
19. Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo: "Auditor Size and Audit Quality" Journal of Accounting & Economics, 3(1981) PP. 183-199.
20. Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo: "Auditor Independence, Low Balling" and Disclosure Regulation" Journal of Accounting & Economics 3(1981) PP. 113-127.
21. Michael C. Knapp: "Audit Conflict: An Empirical Study of the Perceived Ability of Auditors to Resist Management Press" The Accounting Review, Vol. LX, No. 2, April 1985, PP. 202-211.
22. Michael C.J. and W.M. Mekling: "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics 3(1976) PP. 305-360.
23. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling: "Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" Journal of financial Economics
3(1976) PP. 305-360.
24. Ng, David S. "Supply and Demand of Auditing Services and the Nature of Regulations in Auditing", Arthur Young Professors' Roundtable Conference Proceedinfs, 1978, PP. 99-124.
25. Ordover, J. "Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents", The Journal of Legal Studies, June 1978, PP. 243-261,
26. Richard P. Brief "The Accountants' Responsibility in Historical Perspective" The Accounting Review, April 1975, PP. 285-297.
27. Robert Wilson: "The Theory of Syndicates" Econometrica,
Vol. 36, No. 1, January 1968, PP. 119-133.
28. Robert Wilson: "Auditing: Perspectives from Multiperson Decision Theory", The Accounting Review, Vol. LV111m No. 2, April 1983, PP. 303-318.
29. Robert S. Kaplan: "The Evolution of Management Accounting", The Accounting Review. Vol. LIX No. 3 July 1984, PP. 390-418.
30. Scott W., "Auditors' Loss Functions Implicit in Consumption-Imvestment Models," Journal of Accounting Research, Supplement, 1975, PP.98-117.
31. Simon, M. "Imperfect Information, Costly Litigation, and Product Quality", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 1981, PP. 171-184.
32. Simon Elliot B. : "Can the auditor be truly independent?” Accountancy (June 1980) PP. 105-106.
33. Stanley Baiman, "Agency Research in Managerial Accounting: A Survey", Journal of Accounting Literature, Spring 1982, PP. 155-213.
34. Stephen A. Ross: "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principals' Problem", American Economic Association, May 1973, Vol. 63, No. 2, PP. 134-139.
35. Steven Shavell: "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship”, The Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1979, PP. 55-73.
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