本文建構一個簡單的R&D成長模型，特色為導向的技術進步與專利權保護程度，比較整體經濟存在一體適用的專利權保護程度與非一體適用的專利權保護程度，對於整體的技術發展發向、工資不均度及經濟成長將有何影響。我們有以下幾點發現，第一，一體適用的專利權保護程度將使得技術發展方向均衡發展；非一體適用的專利權保護程度將使得技術朝向專利權保護程度較高的產業發展。第二，非一體適用的專利權保護程度造成工資不均度擴大，且主要透過兩種方式影響工資不均度，分別為相對價格效果與技術導向效果。第三，一體適用的專利權保護程度使得資源配置較有效率，故擁有較高的經濟成長率；非一體適用的專利權保護程度使得資源配置較無效率，導致較低的經濟成長率。

This thesis sets up an R&D-based growth model featuring directed technical change and patent protection, and uses it to examine the relative effects of the relative technologies, wage inequality, and economic growth between one-size-fits-all patent protection and one-size-not-fit-all counterpart. Several main findings emerge from the analysis. First, the one-size-fits-all patent protection policy leads to neutral technical change between high-skilled and low-skilled R&D sectors, while the one-size-not-fit-all patent protection policy results in biased technical change toward the higher patent protection industry. Second, one-size-not-fit-all patent protection tends to raise wage inequality by way of two channels: the relative price effect and directed technical change effect. Third, because the one-size-fits-all patent protection policy makes the resource allocation more efficient, it exhibits a higher economic growth rate compared to one-size-not-fit-all patent protection policy.

一、 中文部分
賴景昌 (2018)。R&D內生成長理論，講義。
賴景昌 (2018)。R&D內生成長理論：導向的技術進步，講義。
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