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| 研究生： |
白仲彥 Pai, Chung-Yen |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
政治壓力對犯罪報告的扭曲效果: 以臺灣政府的誘因結構設計為例 The Distortion Effects of Political Pressure on Crime Reporting: Evidence from Government's Incentive Design in Taiwan |
| 指導教授： | 蔡致遠 |
| 口試委員: |
蔡致遠
楊子霆 溫偉任 |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
商學院 - 國際經營與貿易學系 Department of International Business |
| 論文出版年： | 2020 |
| 畢業學年度： | 108 |
| 語文別： | 英文 |
| 論文頁數： | 39 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 績效考核 、破案率 、選舉 、誘因設計 、代理人問題 |
| 外文關鍵詞： | Performance Evaluation, Clearance Rate, Election, Incentive Design, Principal-Agent Problem |
| DOI URL： | http://doi.org/10.6814/NCCU202000951 |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：102 下載：10 |
| 分享至: |
| 查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報 |
過去20年來，臺灣警政署公布的破案率持續成長，近幾年已經超過95%，與民眾體驗及世界上其它國家的情況相比，可說是相當異常的數據。首先，我們注意到在績效考核制度實施後，破案率逐年上升的趨勢明顯，且破案率的機率分配在績效目標值附近有急遽而顯著的不連續，這些跡象指出破案率數據可能受到了人為操縱，無法反映實際的治安狀況。接著，我們利用差異中之差異法，進一步比較各縣市破案率達到績效目標值的機率。結果顯示選舉年對縣市長符合連選資格的縣市影響較大，與縣市長不符合連選資格或非選舉年的縣市相比，選舉誘因能使破案率達到績效目標值的機率成長約22%。簡單地說，我們發現政治壓力與不當誘因設計可能促使警方操縱犯罪數據，呈現行政效率良好的假象。
We inspect the reason that crime clearance rates in Taiwan kept escalating to abnormal levels. To begin with, we notice the clearance rates have been surging after the introduction of a performance evaluation program, and we find sharp discontinuities in reported clearance rates at the program targets, suggestive of manipulation. In addition, we adopt a difference-in-differences design and compare the likelihood of surpassing performance targets concerning crime clearance in cities whose mayors responded to election incentives with those did not. The results indicate election incentives lead to around 22 percent increase in the likelihood of meeting performance targets. In sum, our findings imply political pressure and inappropriate incentive design may induce the police to game crime statistics.
中文摘要 i
Abstract ii
Contents iii
List of Tables v
List of Figures vi
1 Introduction 1
2 Institutional Background 3
2.1 The Target of Clearance Rates in Taiwan 3
3 Data and Sample 9
3.1 Data 9
3.2 Sample and Variables 11
4 Results 13
4.1 Discontinuities around the Targeted Clearance Rate 13
4.2 Effect of Local Incentives 20
4.3 Robustness Check 24
5 Conclusion 35
Appendix A Available Policy Plans and Performance Reports 36
Appendix B McCrary’s Test for ClearanceRate/Floor 37
Appendix C McCrary’s Test for ClearanceRate/CityFloor 38
Bibliography 39
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