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| 研究生： |
鄧英華 Teng, Ying Hung |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
訊息不對稱下企業薪資結構之探討 The study about enterprise's wage structure in the asymmetric information |
| 指導教授： |
胡聯國
Hu, Len Kuo |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
商學院 - 國際經營與貿易學系 Department of International Business |
| 論文出版年： | 1994 |
| 畢業學年度： | 82 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 68 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 薪資談判 、訊息不對稱 、承諾均衡 、非承諾均衡(完全貝氏均衡) |
| 外文關鍵詞： | wage bargaining, asymmetric information, commitment equilibrium, nocommitment equilibrium |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：233 下載：0 |
| 分享至: |
| 查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報 |
過去處理勞資雙方工資談判的文獻，多數假設勞資雙方的訊息是對稱的，
或採合作談判解，或採非合作談判解，他們得到結果多為工資協議往往非
常順利，不會有不合議的事件發生。但事實上勞資雙方談判時，公司的經
營能力或策略、工人之生產力往往是談判雙方互不了解的，也就是現實工
資談判中普遍存有訊息不對稱的情況。本文擬在訊息不對稱的情形下，假
設談判的一方訊息不完全--工會不了解公司的經營能力，設定一個兩期工
資談判模型，僅由工會提議工資，公司之反提議僅為接受或拒絕工會之提
議工資。探討模型之承諾均衡與完全貝氏均衡，並對影響完全貝氏均衡之
因素做進一步之探討。
第一章 序論
第一節 研究動機與目的 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
第二節 本文內容與架構 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2
第二章 文獻回顧
第一節 前言 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3
第二節 Nash談判均衡解及相關文獻 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4
第三節 Rubinstein子賽局完全均衡及相關文獻- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9
第四節 完全貝氏均衡及相關文獻- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11
本章註釋- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -15
第三章 理論模型
第一節 前言- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 16
第二節 基本假設與定義- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -20
第三節 承諾均衡與非承諾均衡 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 22
第四節 工會談判架構之選擇- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -35
本章註釋- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -37
第四章 影響均衡之因素
第一節 影響均衡之因素（一）- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 39
第二節 影響均衡之因素（二）- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 51
第三節 小結- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 61
本章註釋- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 62
第五章 結論- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -65
參考文獻
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in product aod labor markets." AEA Pappers and
Proceedings,1988 ,356-362
[2] Ausubel Lawrence M. and Deneckere Raymond J. : "A
direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining
with one-sided incomplete information." Journal of Economic
Theory, 1989,18-46
[3] Brander, James A. and Tracy R. Lewis : "Oligopoly and financial
structure: The limited liability effect." American EcCJ"nomic
Review, 1986,76,956-970
[4] Cheung Francis K. and Davidson Carl: «Bargaining structure
and strike activity." Canadian Journal of Economics,1991,345-
371
[5] Fernandez Raquel and Glazer Jacob: «(Striking for a bargain
between two completely information agents." American Economic
Review,1991,240-252
[6] Fundenberg Drew and Tirole Jean : "Sequential bargaining
with incomplete information."Review of Economic
St udies ,1983,221-247
[7]Gibbons, Robert: “Game Theory for Applied Economists.” Princeton University Press.
[8]Grossman Sanford J. and Perry Motty: Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information “ Journal of Economic Theory, 1986, 120-154.
[9]Haller Hans and Holden Steinar: “A letter on the Editor on wage Bargaining” Journal of Economic Theory, 1990,232-236
[10]Horn Henrick and Wolinsky Asher:”Bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger.”Rand Journal of Economics, 1989, 408-419.
[11]Mercuro Nicholas and Sourbis Haralambos and Whitney Gerald:”Ownership Structure value of the firm , and the bargaining power of the manager.”
[12]Nash, J.F. : The bargaining problem.” Econometrica, 1950, 155-162
[13]Reyniers Diane J.:”Information and rationality asymmetries in a simple high-low search wage modle.” Economic Letters, 1992, 38, 479-486
[14]Rubinsten Ariel:”Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. “Econometrica, 1982,97-109.
[15]Sobel Joel and Takahashi Ichiro: “A multistage model of bargaining.” Review of Economics Studies, 1983, 411-426.
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