| 研究生: |
郭振雄 Kuo, Jenn Shyong |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
從海耶克假說到動物本能:競爭性實驗市場的徑轉換 From Hayek Hypothesis to Animal Spirit:The Transition Based On Competitive Experimental Markets |
| 指導教授: |
陳樹衡
Chen, Shu Heng |
| 學位類別: |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱: |
社會科學學院 - 經濟學系 Department of Economics |
| 論文出版年: | 1993 |
| 畢業學年度: | 81 |
| 語文別: | 英文 |
| 論文頁數: | 68 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 海耶克假說 、動物本能 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Hayek Hypothesis, Animal Spirit, Sup & Inf function PDP, Uncertainty-adjusted efficiency |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:159 下載:0 |
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By means of the experimental oral double auction markets, this
thesis shows that the Hayek hypothesis might not be valid when
uncertainty is introduced into the markets. More precisely ,
our experimental results evidence that the efficiency loss
increases as the degree of uncertainty increases. Furthermore,
as our convergence analyses suggests, the flat sup of the
efficiency and the flat inf of the P-Q norm in Experiment 1,
the experiment without uncertainty, seems to reflect the market
behavior characterized by rational expectations or rational
learning. On the other hand, the decreasing sup of the
efficiency and the increasing inf of the P-Q norm in
Experiment 2, the experiment with uncertainty, seems to reflect
the market behaviour characterized by bounded rationality or
animal spirits. Therefore, a phase transition from rational
expectations to animal spirits might be parameterized by the
degree of uncertainty. These findings have important
implications for the current controversy on bounded rationality
in macroeconomics. They also reflect the limitation of using
the method of certainty equivalence in treating uncertainty
when the market is regarded as parallel distributed processors
rather than a central unit processor.
1 Motivation and Introduction 1
2 Experimental Design and Procedure 10
2.1 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
2.2 Experimental Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
3 Experimental Results 19
3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
3.1.1 Efficiency: E(t) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
3.1.2 Trading Volume: q(t) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
3.1.3 Contract Prices: p(t) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
3.2 Convergence of Contract Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2.1 Relative Adjustment Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3 Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3.1 The Inf Function and Weakly Observable Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.2 The Sup Function and Strongly Observable Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
3.4 Distance from the Theoretical Equilibrium: P-Q Norm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42
4 Concluding Remarks 45
5 Appendix 63
.1 簡介. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
.2 簡介一號. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
.2.1 事件發生的產生方式. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
.3 簡介二號. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
.3.1 一般簡介. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
.3.2 賣方簡介. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
.3.3 買方簡介. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
.3.4 買方簡介. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
.3.5 市場結構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
.3.6 Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77
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