在以銀行融資為主之金融體系下，企業與金融機構間的資訊不對稱，往往會影響銀行對企業風險之評估與授信條件。近年來，獨立董事除監督功能之外，其所具備之外部資源與社會網絡亦逐漸受到重視，其中具政治背景之獨立董事是否能透過政商關係與外部信用效果協助企業降低借貸成本，形成所謂的「門神效應」，已成為公司治理與政治經濟領域的重要議題。本研究以2013年至2019年台灣上市公司為研究對象，資料主要取自臺灣經濟新報資料庫（TEJ），並採用追蹤資料（Panel Data）迴歸模型，探討獨立董事政治關聯性對企業借貸成本之影響。實證結果顯示出具政治關聯之獨立董事與企業借貸成本呈顯著負向關係，代表政治背景有助於降低企業融資成本，顯示台灣企業確實存在一定程度之政治連結門神效果。且進一步異質化分析發現，此效果在小規模公司、低資產抵押性公司以及高研發投入公司中更為明顯，顯示當企業本身資源較有限、擔保能力較弱或資訊不對稱程度較高時，政治關聯所帶來之外部信用與資源連結效果可能更加重要。整體而言，本研究顯示獨立董事之政治背景不僅具有公司治理層面之意涵，也可能透過降低資訊不對稱與提升債權人信任進一步影響企業之外部融資成本，研究結果除補充台灣政治關聯與公司治理相關文獻外，亦反映政治連結在我國金融市場中仍具一定程度之經濟效果與實務影響。

In a bank-oriented financial system, information asymmetry between firms and financial institutions often affects lending decisions and borrowing costs. In addition to their monitoring role, independent directors may also provide external resources and social networks. Whether politically connected independent directors can help firms reduce financing costs through political ties and enhanced external credibility—known as the “door-keeper effect”—has become an important issue in corporate governance research. This study examines Taiwanese listed companies from 2013 to 2019 using data from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database and panel data regression models. The results show that politically connected independent directors are significantly associated with lower corporate borrowing costs, suggesting that political connections help firms obtain more favorable financing conditions. Further analyses indicate that this effect is more pronounced in smaller firms, firms with lower asset tangibility, and firms with higher R&D intensity. These findings imply that political connections become more valuable when firms face greater information asymmetry or weaker collateral capacity. Overall, this study suggests that the political backgrounds of independent directors may reduce external financing costs by enhancing creditors’ confidence and alleviating information asymmetry. The findings also provide evidence that political connections continue to have economic significance in Taiwan’s financial market.

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