本論文旨在剖析經理人報酬之內在配置與市場穩定性之關係，聚焦於較高的執行長總薪酬（CEO compensation）是否會誘發管理階層隱瞞負面訊息，催化公司未來的尾端下行曝險，並識別出驅動此風險的具體薪酬組成元件 。基於「負面消息隱瞞（bad news hoarding）」機制，當 CEO 的個人財富高度依賴當前股價時，管理團隊策略性隱匿營運挫敗之傾向便大幅提升，以避免股價立即下跌。這種隱瞞行為使得內部損失在財務不透明的屏障下不斷累積，一旦越過無法承載的上限，終將致使股價崩盤。為了檢驗「CEO 總薪酬與未來股價是否崩盤之間存在正向關係（假說一）」以及「此關係主要由股權型薪酬而非現金型薪酬所驅動（假說二）」等假說，本研究採用了 1992 年至 2024 年於 NYSE、AMEX 和 NASDAQ 掛牌之美國企業進行實證。最終的不平衡面板樣本包含 40,921 個公司年度觀測值，數據整合自 Execucomp、CRSP 和 Compustat 資料庫，並採用負偏態係數（NCSKEW）、上下波動率（DUVOL）及崩盤虛擬變數（CRASH）來衡量股價崩盤風險。

This dissertation examines the empirical association between the architectural design of managerial payouts and capital market stability. Specifically, we explore whether elevated aggregate CEO remuneration motivates corporate leaders to strategically withhold unfavorable organizational information, thereby resulting in a higher stock price crash risk, while concurrently identifying the exact financial vehicles that catalyze this risk. Drawing upon the theoretical framework of 'bad news hoarding', a tight coupling between an executive's personal portfolio and contemporary market valuations incentivizes the deliberate withholding of adverse organizational performance to avert sudden equity depreciation. This concealment allows internal losses to accumulate behind a veil of financial opacity until a tipping point is reached, leading to an inevitable and severe market correction. To empirically evaluate the predictions that aggregate managerial remuneration escalates forward-looking tail risk exposure (H1) and that this destabilizing effect stems predominantly from equity-linked incentives as opposed to cash-denominated awards (H2), we analyze public U.S. enterprises trading across major national exchanges between 1992 and 2024. Our final unbalanced panel comprises 40,921 firm-year records constructed by merging information from Execucomp, CRSP, and Compustat repositories. Equity downside fragility is operationally proxied via continuous crash measures (NCSKEW and DUVOL), and a discrete dummy crash indicator (CRASH).

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