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研究生: 黃柏鈞
Huang, Po Chun
論文名稱: 預測競賽, 解釋預測機構的行為
Explaining forecasters' behavior: sequential forecast contest
指導教授: 莊委桐
Juang, Wei Torng
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 社會科學學院 - 經濟學系
Department of Economics
論文出版年: 2009
畢業學年度: 97
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 23
中文關鍵詞: 預測競賽群聚反群聚
外文關鍵詞: Forecast Contest, Herding, Abti-Herding
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  • Paradoxically, pepole avoid being totally the same with others to keep their uniquness but follow the fads to avoid isolation. We construct a simple model under this concept to explain the empirical findings of forecasters’ behavior such as old forecasters are more radical and late forecasters tend to anti-herd. We show that forecasters' forecasts are not necessarilly unbiased when they consider
    the benefit of making correct forecasts and the cost of being wrong. Furthermore, we extended our model and show that when uninformed agent cannot differentiate which informed agents is better, she chooses mean of the two experts' opinions when the difference of the opinions is small but choose randomly from the two experts' opinions when the difference is big.

    1 Introduction 1
    2 A Model of 2 Informed Agents 5
    2.1 Set Up 5
    2.2 Equilibrium 6
    2.3 Old Analyst v.s. Young Analyst 8
    3 A Model of 3 Informed Agents 10
    3.1 Why Forecasters Lag Behind Reality 10
    3.2 Late Forecasters Tend to Anti-Herd 11
    4 Extension: Mean or Extreme 13
    4.1 An Example 13
    5 Conclusion 16
    Appendix 18
    Reference 23

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