| 研究生: |
林宛儀 |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
公營廠商民營化的最適釋股比例分析―考慮租稅的情況 The optimal government shareholdings in public enterprises in the process of privatization within tax evasion economy |
| 指導教授: | 翁堃嵐 |
| 學位類別: |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱: |
社會科學學院 - 財政學系 Department of Public Finance |
| 論文出版年: | 2012 |
| 畢業學年度: | 100 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 29 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 公司稅 、公營廠商 、民營化 、最適持股 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | corporate tax, public enterprise, privatization, optimal shareholdings |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:205 下載:47 |
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邱俊榮與黃鴻 (2006) 一文在忽略租稅負擔的情況下,探討公營廠商民營化的最適釋股比例問題,文中發現:在開放體系下,廠商邊際成本固定並採Cournot數量競爭,唯在公營廠商生產效率較民營廠商生產效率低時政府才有動機將產業民營化,然而實際上租稅負擔會影響到廠商的有效邊際成本,進而影響其產出決策,最後再影響民營化的最適釋股比例。有鑑於此,本文在邱俊榮與黃鴻 (2006) 一文中導入利潤稅制與公司稅制,別探討此二種稅制的引進如何影響到最適的釋股比例。文中發現:利潤稅的存在將提高政府的最適釋股比例,而且最適釋股比例隨著稅率增加而增加,不過,在利潤稅制下唯在公營廠商生產效率較民營廠商生產效率低時政府才有動機將產業民營化。然而,公司稅對於最適釋股比例影響方向並不明確。比較有趣的是,在公司稅制下即使公營廠商生產效率與民營廠商相同,政府仍有動機將產業民營化,此部份有異於邱俊榮與黃鴻 (2006) 一文所獲致的結果。
第一章、緒論 1
第二章、文獻回顧 2
第三章、基本模型 6
3.1租稅制度為利潤稅制的情況 6
3.2租稅制度為公司稅制的情況 16
第四章、結論 27
參考文獻 28
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