傳統探討移轉訂價的文獻忽略了廠商可以進行租稅逃漏的事實。有鑒於此，本文設立擁有一個外國子公司的跨國企業母公司，母公司在追求預期稅後利潤極大之目標下，不僅會進行移轉訂價，同時也會從事租稅逃漏的活動。在此設定之下，本文重新探討並比較公式計價與分離會計兩種移轉訂價的課稅制度。依據本文的研究顯示：在引入跨國企業母公司可從事租稅逃漏行為之情況下，公式計價制度雖具有避免企業利用移轉訂價轉移跨國間利潤之優點，卻會誘發企業進行租稅逃漏行為。且當兩國稅率具有差異時，FA制度下存在誘發MNE逃漏高於SA制度下更多租稅之可能性。因此從稅基流失的觀點來看，公式計價制度不必然會優於分離會計制度。換言之，此一結果可對傳統移轉訂價文獻認為公式計價課稅基礎相對分離會計課稅基礎能完全抑制跨國企業從事移轉訂價活動避免稅基流失的觀點提出不同的看法。

The traditional literature discussing transfer pricing ignores the fact that multinational enterprises (MNEs) can evade taxation. In view of this, this paper establishes a multinational parent company with a foreign subsidiary. The parent company will not only transfer prices but also engage in tax evasion activities in pursuit of maximizing the goal after-tax profits. Under this setting, this paper reexamines and compares two transfer pricing systems of formula apportionment (FA) and separate accounting (SA). According to the research in this paper, when the introduction of multinational parent companies can engage in tax evasion activities, although formula apportionment still has the advantage of preventing companies from using transfer pricing to transfer profits between countries, it will induce MNEs to evade taxation. And when there are differences in tax rates between the two countries, there is a possibility that FA will induce more tax evasion from MNE than under SA. Therefore, from the perspective of tax base loss, formula apportionment is not necessarily better than the separate accounting. In other words, this result can put forward different views on whether FA is a superior method of taxing multinationals.

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