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研究生： 吳建達
論文名稱： Does financial structure matter for dividend policy?
指導教授： 屠美亞
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 商學院 - 財務管理學系
Department of Finance
論文出版年： 2006
畢業學年度： 91
語文別： 英文
相關次數： 點閱：86  下載：0 
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    • 這篇論文主要在探討以不同融資方式為主的經濟體，是否會對個別公司的股利政策造成影響，我們針對15個國家1244家公司作探討，發現在以銀行債為主要融資方式的國家，個別公司相對發放較低的股利，並且現金股利亦呈現較高的波動度，顯示資訊不對稱的嚴重性，是造成不同資本市場有不同股利政策的原因之一。

    Abstract

    This paper examines whether differences in the sophistication of capital markets drive dividend policies to vary across countries, by studying on dividend policies of 1244 firms in 15 countries. We find that reliance on banking sector causes lower dividend payout and incentives for dividend smoothing. The same relationship is also found between quality of accounting system and dividend policies. These results confirm that less information asymmetry defuses the need for using dividends as signaling and discipline tools. Furthermore, we find that there exists a positive relation between development of stock market and payout level. This indicates that more important the stock in providing capital to firms, the more likely the firms increase their dividend payout. Finally, some evidences support that a shorter investment horizon leads to a higher payout ratio and a higher extent of dividend smoothing.

    Context
    Chapter 1. Introduction 1
    Chapter 2. Literature review 5
    2.1. Asymmetric information and dividends 5
    2.1.1 Agency cost models 6
    2.1.2 Signaling models 7
    2.1.3 Other models about dividends 7
    2.2. Dividends smoothing under information asymmetry 8
    2.3.The monitoring role provided by bank 9
    2.4. Development of capital markets and dividends 10
    2.5. Tax and dividends 11
    Chapter 3. Data and methodology 13
    3.1. Data descriptions 13
    3.1.1 Worldscope Database 13
    3.1.2 World Bank dataset 16
    3.1.3 Testable hypothesis 18
    3.2 Empirical Methodology 19
    3.2.1 Comparison analyses 19
    3.2.2 Spearman correlations test 20
    3.2.3 Factor analysis with principal components 21
    3.2.4 Random effects specification 21
    Chapter 4. Empirical results 23
    4.1Descriptive statistics 23
    4.2.Comparasion analyses 27
    4.3Regressions results: 29
    4.4 Robustness 33
    Chapter 5. Conclusions and suggestions 35
    References 37

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