跳到主要內容

簡易檢索 / 詳目顯示

研究生: 邱鈺玶
Chiu,Yu Ping
論文名稱: 台灣集團經營的成本及效益分析:聯貸市場議價能力的實證結果
The costs and benefits of group and non-group firms in Taiwan: evidence from the bargaining power in the syndication loan market
指導教授: 張元晨
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 商學院 - 財務管理學系
Department of Finance
論文出版年: 2011
畢業學年度: 99
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 40
中文關鍵詞: 台灣聯貸市場台灣集團
相關次數: 點閱:165下載:0
分享至:
查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報
  • 為了研究台灣集團的經營成本和效益,本研究計算超額價值發現台灣集團下的公司並沒有比非集團公司表現更好,本研究進而以五個假說和台灣區的聯貸案來檢視集團經營成本效益,集團下的公司經營成本會高於效益


    To examine the costs and benefits of group and non-group firms in Taiwan we first calculated the excess vale of group firms. We find that group firms in Taiwan do not out-perform relative to non-group firms. To find out the reason behind their underperformance, we test five hypotheses, the profit stability hypothesis, the over-investment hypothesis, the cross-subsidization hypothesis, the co-insurance hypothesis, the bargaining power hypothesis, using data from 1998 to 2008. Our sample consists of 16950 firm samples, 208 group sample, and 3013 syndication deal samples. The results show that the group overall borrowing costs are larger than non-group firms and group characteristic does not influence the spread margin in the syndication market significantly. We conclude that cost exceed benefits for firms to operate under group affiliations.

    Table of contents
    1.INTRODUCTION 4
    2.LITERATURE REVIEW 5
    2.1 GROUP DEFINITION 5
    2.2 GROUP PERFORMANCE 6
    2.3 SYNDICATION MARKET 7
    2.4 HYPOTHESIS RELATED LITERATURES 8
    3.DATA AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 9
    4.METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESIS 18
    4.1 THE PROFIT STABILITY HYPOTHESIS 18
    4.2 THE OVER-INVESTMENT HYPOTHESIS 19
    4.3 THE CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION HYPOTHESIS 19
    4.4 THE CO-INSURANCE HYPOTHESIS 19
    4.5 THE BARGAINING POWER HYPOTHESIS 19
    5.EMPIRICAL RESULTS 20
    6.CONCLUSION 37
    REFERENCE 38

    Anderson, R. C., and D. M. Reeb 2003, Founding-family ownership and firm performance:evidence from the S&P 500. The Journal of Finance 3 : 1301-132

    Bae, K. and V. K. Goyal 2008,“Creditor Rights,Enforcement, and Bank Loans” Journal of Finance

    Berger, P., Ofek, E. 1995, Diversification's effect on firm value. Journal of Financial Economics 37, 39–65.

    Dennis, A.S., and D.J. Mullineaux 2000, Syndicated loans, Journal of Financial Intermediation 9, 404-426

    Encarnation D. 1989, Dislodging Multinationals: India’s Comparative Perspective.Cornell University Press:Ithaca, NY.

    Fan, J. P.H., and T.J. Wong. 2002,Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earning in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics: 401-425.

    Ferris, Kim, Kitsabunnarat 2003,The costs (and benefits?) of diversified business groups: The case of Korean chaebols Journal of Banking & Finance Volume 27, Issue 2, February 2003, Pages 251-273

    Filatotchev, I., Y. C. Lien, and J. Piesse. 2005, Corporate governance and performance in publicly listed, family-controlled firms: Evidence from Taiwan. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 22: 257–283.

    Gerlach 1992,The Japanese corporate network: A blockmodel analysis Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 37, No. 1, Mar., 1992

    Joh, S.W., 2003,“Corporate Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence from Korea before the Crisis,” Journal of Financial Economics 68, 2003, 287-322.

    Kang, J.-K., Kim, Y.-C., Stulz, R.M., 1999,The underreaction hypothesis and the new issue puzzle: Evidence from Japan. Review of Financial Studies 12, 519–534.

    Khanna and Rivkin 2001,Estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging marketsStrategic Management Journal Volume 22, Issue 1, pages 45–74, 2001/1/1

    Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 2000, Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business groups. Journal of Finance 55, 867–891.

    Kim, C.S., 2002,“Is the Investment of Korean Conglomerates Inefficient?” The Korean Economics Review, 2002, 5-24.

    Lang, L.H.P., Stulz, R.M., 1994,Tobin's q, corporate diversification and firm performance. Journal of Political Economy 102, 1248–1280

    LaPorta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999,Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 54, 471–517.

    Leff 1978 ,Industrial organization and entrepreneurship in the developing countries: The economic Economic development and cultural change Vol. 26, No. 4, Jul., 1978

    Lemmon, M.L. and Lin, K.V. 2003,Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis. Journal of Finance,58,1445-1468

    Lins, K.V. 2003,Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 159-184.

    Meyer, M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., 1992,Organizational prospects, influence costs, and ownership changes. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 1, 9–35

    Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1988,Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293-315.

    Morck, R., Nakamura, M. 1999, Banks and corporate control in Japan. Journal of Finance 54, 319–339.

    Nakatani, I., 1984, The economic role of corporate financial groupings. In: Aoki, M. (Ed.), Economic Analysis of the Japanese Firm. Elsevier, New York.

    Prowse, S., 1992,The structure of corporate ownership in Japan. Journal of Finance 42, 1121–1140.

    Qian, J. and Strahan, P. 2007,How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: the Case of Bank Loans[J]. Journal of Finance, 62: 2803–2834.

    Shin, H., Park, Y.S., 1999,Financing constraints and internal capital markets: Evidence from Koreanchaebols. Journal of Corporate Finance 5, 169–191.

    Stulz, R.M., 1990,Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of Financial Economics 26, 3–27.

    Weinstein, D.E., Yafeh, Y., 1998,On the cost of a bank centered financial system: Evidence from the changing main bank relations in Japan. Journal of Finance 53,
    635–672.

    無法下載圖示 此全文未授權公開
    QR CODE
    :::