近年來，在低利率環境及信用市場持續擴張下，房價快速上升已成為各國中央銀行與金融監理機關共同關注的重要議題。傳統貨幣政策主要以穩定通貨膨脹與產出為目標，然而全球金融危機後，房價與信用循環所累積之風險逐漸受到重視，使中央銀行是否應將房價穩定納入政策考量，以及貨幣政策與總體審慎政策如何相互配合，成為重要研究課題。
本文建立一個包含家戶、廠商、銀行及中央銀行之一般均衡模型，以分析無風險政策利率與資本適足率對房價、信用市場及總體經濟之影響。模型中，家戶透過房屋作為抵押品向銀行借款，企業利用銀行貸款進行投資，銀行則受到資本適足率限制進行最適放款決策，中央銀行則以無風險政策利率作為貨幣政策工具，並比較不同政策目標下之最適政策決策。本文採用校準法（Calibration）建立基準經濟，並進行比較靜態分析、最適政策分析、政策互動分析及動態調整分析。
研究結果顯示，提高無風險政策利率或資本適足率皆可有效降低房價、房屋貸款、企業貸款及總產出。然而，兩項政策工具具有不同之傳遞機制，前者主要透過提高資金成本抑制信用需求，後者則透過提高銀行資本約束限制信用供給。此外，當中央銀行將房價納入政策目標後，最適無風險政策利率將提高，顯示房價穩定將使貨幣政策傾向採取較為緊縮之立場；另一方面，提高資本適足率則會降低中央銀行之最適無風險政策利率，反映貨幣政策與總體審慎政策具有一定程度之替代效果。最後，動態模擬結果顯示，政策衝擊係透過銀行信用市場逐步傳遞至房地產市場與實體經濟，各主要變數最終均收斂至新的穩態均衡。
綜合而言，本文說明貨幣政策與總體審慎政策皆可有效影響房價及信用市場，而兩項政策工具之適當搭配，有助於兼顧房價穩定與總體經濟發展，並可作為中央銀行制定政策之參考。

In recent years, persistent low interest rates and rapid credit expansion have led to substantial increases in housing prices, making housing market stability an important concern for both central banks and financial regulators. While conventional monetary policy primarily focuses on price stability and output stabilization, the Global Financial Crisis highlighted the importance of housing prices and credit cycles in maintaining macroeconomic stability. Consequently, whether central banks should incorporate housing price stability into their policy objectives and how monetary policy should interact with macroprudential policy have become important research issues.

This study develops a general equilibrium model consisting of households, firms, banks, and a central bank to examine the effects of the risk-free policy interest rate and capital adequacy requirements on housing prices, credit markets, and aggregate output. In the model, households borrow against housing collateral, firms finance investment through bank loans, banks determine optimal lending subject to capital adequacy constraints, and the central bank sets the risk-free policy rate under alternative policy objectives. Model parameters are calibrated using the calibration approach, and the analysis includes comparative statics, optimal policy analysis, policy interaction analysis, and transitional dynamics.

The results show that increases in either the risk-free policy interest rate or the capital adequacy ratio reduce housing prices, mortgage lending, corporate lending, and aggregate output. However, the two policy instruments operate through different transmission mechanisms. The policy interest rate mainly affects credit demand by increasing financing costs, whereas capital adequacy requirements reduce credit supply by tightening banks' capital constraints. Furthermore, when housing price stability is incorporated into the central bank's loss function, the optimal risk-free policy rate becomes higher, implying a relatively tighter monetary policy stance. In contrast, stricter capital adequacy requirements lower the optimal policy interest rate, suggesting a substitution relationship between monetary policy and macroprudential policy. Finally, the transitional dynamics indicate that policy shocks are gradually transmitted through the banking sector to the housing market and the real economy before converging to a new steady-state equilibrium.

Overall, this study demonstrates that both monetary policy and macroprudential policy play important roles in stabilizing housing prices and credit markets. The findings provide useful policy implications regarding the coordination between monetary policy and macroprudential regulation.

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