為因應都市老舊建築亟需更新需求，如何兼顧重建速度與土地使用效率，已成為都市再開發的重要課題。自《都市危險及老舊建築物加速重建條例》2017年上路以來，時程獎勵一直屬鼓勵民眾及早申請重建政策工具；惟實施後逐漸出現小基地高容積現象，爰於2020年進行修法，延長時程獎勵，增設規模獎勵並放寬鄰地合併限制，期望藉由雙重誘因兼顧加速重建與擴大整合規模之目標。
惟規模獎勵需透過擴大整合取得額外容積，整合過程可能面臨談判人數增加或地主採取策略性延遲，進而延後重建申請時程，與此同時，時程獎勵仍持續遞減。在兩項容積獎勵合計上限10%之限制下，行為人可能須於「保有時程獎勵」與「投入整合以取得規模獎勵」間權衡，進而影響後續重建基地規模。
故本研究以新北市都市計畫區內2017年至2024年底共468筆之危老核准案件作為研究樣本。利用無母數檢定、卡方檢定及多元線性迴歸，分別從基地規模分布、面積結構變化及產權異質性剖析修法效果。並運用兩部模型(Two-Part Model)拆解起造人「是否取得規模獎勵」與「申請額度」之誘因選擇決策，再以樣條線性迴歸，探討時程獎勵與規模獎勵間之階段性替代關係。
實證結果發現，修法後核准重建基地面積整體上移，零碎基地案件比例下降，惟政策效益主要集中於產權完整案件；產權細碎案件受整合成本限制，基地規模增幅相對有限。誘因選擇上，產權細碎案件取得規模獎勵之機率隨時程獎勵遞減而下降，整合風險使行為人偏好時程獎勵；相較之下，產權完整案件則逐步將選擇重心由時程獎勵轉向規模獎勵。此外，雙重誘因間之替代效果具有階段性，實施初期較明顯；隨政策推進，整合量能趨於上限，規模獎勵能填補時程獎勵遞減之邊際效益有限，替代效果轉為不顯著。整體而言，雙重誘因並非各自獨立發揮作用，而受到產權結構所反映之整合成本制約；未來政策設計上應審慎考量行為人偏好與誘因間的交互作用，以提升誘因配置效益。

In response to mounting renewal pressures from an aging building stock, balancing the pace of reconstruction with land use efficiency has become a central concern in urban redevelopment.
Since the enactment of the Statute for Expediting Reconstruction of Urban Unsafe and Old Buildings in 2017, a time-limited floor area incentive has served as the principal instrument for inducing early reconstruction; yet implementation soon witnessed the emergence of fragmented small-site redevelopment with high floor area ratios. The 2020 amendment subsequently extended the time-limited floor area incentive, introduced a scale-based floor area incentive, a graduated density zoning scheme that grants additional floor area in proportion to the consolidated site size, and relaxed restrictions on the consolidation of adjacent building lots and land, aiming to accelerate reconstruction while enlarging the scale of land assembly.
The two instruments, however, embed an inherent tension. The scale-based floor area incentive is contingent upon land assembly, a process susceptible to landowner holdout and protracted negotiation, whereas the time-limited floor area incentive diminishes over time and pressures rapid filing. Subject to a combined ceiling of 10 percent of the base bulk, developers face a trade-off between securing the time-limited floor area incentive and pursuing additional floor area through assembly; whether this trade-off varies across ownership structures remains underexamined.
Drawing on 468 approved reconstruction projects in New Taipei City between 2017 and 2024, this study investigates the effects of the 2020 amendment on redevelopment scale and developers' behavioral responses. Non-parametric tests, chi-square tests, and multiple regression identify the policy effects on site-area distribution, scale composition, and ownership-based heterogeneity. For projects exposed to both instruments, a two-part model disentangles the probability of receiving the scale-based floor area incentive from the magnitude applied for, while a spline regression captures the stage-dependent substitution between the two instruments.
The findings indicate that the amendment shifted the distribution of approved site areas upward and reduced the prevalence of small size redevelopment, though the gains were concentrated among intact ownership projects; fragmented ownership projects, constrained by higher assembly costs, exhibited only marginal improvement. As the time-limited floor area incentive diminished, fragmented ownership projects became less likely to take up the scale-based floor area incentive, suggesting that assembly risk renders the time-limited incentive more salient. Intact ownership projects, by contrast, gradually reoriented from the time-limited to the scale-based floor area incentive. The substitution between the two was more pronounced in the earlier phase and converged later, as the scope for offsetting the declining time-limited floor area incentive through expanded assembly narrowed over time.
Taken together, the two incentives do not operate independently; their interaction jointly shapes the overall effectiveness of the incentive policy, further conditioned by ownership structure and land assembly costs.

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