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| 研究生： |
林育秀 LIN, YU-XIU |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
不完全訊息下,企業產品決策與資本結構之研究 |
| 指導教授： | 胡聯國 |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
商學院 - 國際經營與貿易學系 Department of International Business |
| 論文出版年： | 1992 |
| 畢業學年度： | 80 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 73 |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：97 下載：0 |
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第一章 緒論
第一節 研究動機與目的. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
第二節 本文內容與架構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
第二章 文獻回顧
第一節 前言. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
第二節 Bergman and Callen(1991) 與Brander and Lewis (1986) 之簡介. . . . . . . .7
第三節 由代理成本之角度探討資本結構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
第四節 由訊息不對稱之角度探討資本結構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
第五節 由產品或要素市場之互動關係的角度探討資本結構. . . .. . . . . . . . .18
第三章 理論模型的建立(一)最適產品決策q地釐定
第一節 前言. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
第二節 最適產品決策之釐定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
第三節 一般化最適產品決策之釐定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
第四節 小結. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
第四章 理論模型的建立(二)最適資本結構D 的釐定
第一節 前言. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
第二節 談判理論(bargaining theory) 的簡介. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
第三節 最適資本結構的釐定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
第四節 小結. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
第五章 結論與建議
第一節 研究結論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
第二節 研究限制與建議. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
附錄. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69
參考文獻. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
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