美國在2001年10月爆發了安達信(Anderson)-安隆（Enron）案，對整個企業界造成極大的衝擊，提供非審計服務究竟是否會影響財務報表品質引起廣泛討論。
因證期會於民國九十二年一月三十日新修正「證券發行人財務報告編製準則」第二十二條，使得資訊相對過往較易取得，雖因研究限制使得樣本不具良好代表性，但在某種程度上仍能提供一定的參考價值，故本研究擬仿效Frankel et al. (2002)之研究，探討在台灣會計師提供非審計服務及審計服務是否會對財務報表品質造成影響；本研究以Threshold（公司實際每股盈餘-分析師預測每股盈餘）及裁量性應計(discretionary accrual)做為財務報表品質之代理變數。
本研究發現上市公司並未因審計公費及非審計公費較高而有進行盈餘管理，但上櫃公司卻會因審計公費及非審計公費較高而進行盈餘管理。

The collapse of Enron and the conflict of interest surrounding their auditors Arthur Anderson, particularly the effect non-audit fees on the quality of the audited financial statements, have resulted in numerous changes to the regulations effectively limiting the level of non-audit service accounting firms can offer to their clients.
The Taiwan SEC enacted new regulations forcing public companies that meet certain criteria, to disclose the level of audit and non-audit fees paid to accounting firms. This resulted in the availability of information that was previously unobtainable. However, concerns still remain, as research is restricted because the number of companies reporting represents a small percentage of the companies in Taiwan. Nonetheless, this research hopes to use the data from the reporting companies to examine the relationship between the quality of the financial statement and the level of fees paid to accounting firms.
We intent to use an adaptation of the Frankel et al. (2002) model to study the companies in Taiwan. Using data provided by the companies we intend to demonstrate a causal relationship between the level of non-audit fees and the quality of the accounting statement. We used Threshold and discretionary accrual to represent the quality of the financial statement.
We found that for the companies listed on the TAIEX there was no relationship between the quality of the financial statements and the level of audit and non-audit fees; however for companies trading on the OTC market we found there was a causal relationship.

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