真實盈餘管理（REM）對企業造成嚴重的負面影響，包括犧牲長期價值創造以達成短期盈餘目標、削減研發投資導致創新能力下降，以及可能誤導投資人對企業真實經營績效的判斷。鑑於這些問題的重要性，本研究探討CEO風險承擔傾向（作為創業導向的一個維度）與美國上市公司透過研發操縱（R&D manipulation）進行真實盈餘管理之間的關係。基於行為代理理論，本研究進一步分析不同形式的高管薪酬（包括現金薪資、股權所有權和股票期權）如何調節這種關係。
透過分析橫跨2000-2023年的綜合資料集，研究發現當CEO具有較高的風險承擔傾向時，更容易發生REM行為。然而，這種關係會受到薪酬結構的顯著調節效果影響。具體而言，較高水準的現金薪酬、股權所有權和股票期權都會削弱CEO風險承擔傾向與REM之間的正向關係。
本研究對理論和實務都有重要貢獻，揭示了個人風險偏好如何與組織激勵機制相互作用，進而影響財務報告決策。對於企業董事會而言，研究結果提供了薪酬設計的具體建議，有助於引導高管將風險承擔行為導向長期價值創造，而非短期的盈餘管理操作。

Real earnings management (REM) has emerged as a significant concern in corporate financial reporting, with far-reaching implications for firm value and economic development. This study examines the relationship between managerial risk-taking propensity, as a dimension of Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO), and real earnings management through R&D manipulation among U.S. listed companies. Drawing on behavioral agency theory, we investigate how different forms of executive compensation—including salary, share ownership, and stock options—moderate this relationship. Through analysis of a comprehensive dataset spanning 2000-2023, we find that higher managerial risk-taking propensity is associated with increased REM activity. However, this relationship is significantly moderated by compensation structure. Specifically, the positive relationship between risk-taking propensity and REM is weakened by higher levels of salary, share ownership, and stock options. Our findings contribute to both theory and practice by illuminating how individual risk preferences interact with organizational incentives to influence financial reporting decisions. For corporate boards, our results suggest specific approaches to compensation design that might help align executive risk-taking with long-term value creation rather than short-term earnings management.

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