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| 研究生： |
李志允 Li, Zhi-Yun |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
考慮下游異質產出競爭與降低成本研發下的內生垂直整合 Endogenous vertical integration in the presence of downstream product differentiation and cost-reducing R&D |
| 指導教授： |
溫偉任
Wen, Wei-Jen |
| 口試委員: |
陳為政
Chen, Wei-Cheng 李文傑 Lee, Wen-Chieh |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
商學院 - 國際經營與貿易學系 Department of International Business |
| 論文出版年： | 2019 |
| 畢業學年度： | 107 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 36 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 垂直整合 、異質產出 、降低成本研發 、社會福利 、過度研發 |
| 外文關鍵詞： | Cost-reducing R&D |
| DOI URL： | http://doi.org/10.6814/NCCU202000235 |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：358 下載：3 |
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本文考慮一個有兩家上游與兩家下游的垂直相關市場，並假設上游廠商生產同質中間財，下游生產異質產品。我們分析當下游廠商可以投入研發以降低生產成本時，垂直整合的福利效果。
研究結果顯示：當少許研發支出就可以大幅降低生產成本(研發效率高)，市場中存在兩家垂直整合廠商時的福利會低於僅有一家垂直整合廠商時的福利。反之，當研發效率低時，市場中存在兩家整合廠商時會有較高的福利。這是因為降低生產成本之研發投入的單位成本過小，使兩家整合市場之廠商投入的研發過多，造成過度研發進而減少社會福利，使市場中存在兩家垂直整合廠商時的福利會低於僅有一家垂直整合廠商時的福利。
This research examines the social welfare of vertical integration market with two upstream firms that produce same quality intermediate goods and two downstream firms that produce differentiation product and downstream firms can invest in cost-reducing R&D. We demonstrate that if firms costing small amount of R&D cost will substantially reducing their producing cost (high R&D efficiency), the social welfare of two vertical integrated firms market will lower than the social welfare of one vertical integrated firm market. In contrast, when R&D efficiency is low, the social welfare of two vertical integrated firms market will higher than the social welfare of one vertical integrated firm market. That’s because the unit cost of cost-reducing R&D is too small, the market of two vertical integrated firms will overinvest in R&D and reduce social welfare. So that the social welfare of two vertical integrated firms market will lower than the social welfare of one vertical integrated firm market.
1 緒論 6
2 文獻回顧 8
3 模型 10
3.1模型基本假設 10
3.2變數定義 11
3.3模型建立 11
3.3.1模型概述 11
3.3.2模型詳述 12
4 均衡結果分析 17
4.1定理一(產量與成本加價) 17
4.2定理二(研發誘因) 18
4.3命題一（研發決策） 19
4.4命題二（恫嚇效果） 20
5 延伸討論 22
5.1不對稱整合進入中間財交易市場之均衡結果 22
5.2.1定理一(產量與成本加價) 23
5.2.2定理二(研發誘因) 24
5.2.3命題一（研發決策） 25
5.2.4命題二（恫嚇效果） 27
6 數值分析 28
6.1觀察一(兩家整合市場與一家整合退出中間財市場之社會福利比較) 28
6.2觀察二(一家整合進入中間財市場與一家整合退出中間財市場之福利比較) 29
7 結論 31
8 附錄 32
4.3 (ii), (iii)證明 32
5.2.2 (ii), (iii)證明 33
9 參考文獻 35
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Wen, W. J., Lee, W. C., and Huang W. H., “Welfare-improving Vertical Mergers in the Presence of Downstream Product Differentiation”
