公司利用特殊目的收購公司(SPAC)在美國上市的情形近年來大幅增加，監管機構擔心SPACs的成長是源於監管法規的漏洞，擔憂其提供過於樂觀的財務預測將會誤導投資者。SPACs受到《私人證券訴訟改革法案》(PSLRA)的安全港條款保護，免除SPACs前瞻性陳述(Forward-Looking Statements)預測不準確之法律責任，前瞻性陳述中最受矚目的是可以提供財務預測增加估值，因此本文主要研究2016年至2021年合併成功的SPACs，提供財務預測對短期及長期股價表現的影響。實證結果顯示SPACs提供樂觀的財務預測會吸引更多的投資者，而這些公司的長期股價表現普遍不佳，也印證監管機構的擔憂。此外，本文也探討影響預測準確度之因素，實證結果顯示，當SPACs為連續發起人時，對預測準確度沒有顯著的影響，而越樂觀的財務預測，其預測結果越不準確。

The companies’ use of Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) to go public in the USA has significantly increased recently. Regulators express concern that the growth of SPACs, results from the regulatory loopholes and that offering overly optimistic financial forecasts, would mislead investors. SPACs are protected by the Safe Harbor Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which is exempted from the legal liability of SPAC’s forward-looking statements (FLS). The most noticeable features in FLS is that firms can provide financial forecasts to increase valuations. Therefore, this thesis is mainly focus on SPACs mergers from 2016 to 2021, exploring SPACs’ financial forecasts on long-term and short-term stock performance. The empirical results show that SPACs’ optimistic forecasts attract more investors, and the long-term stock performance of these companies is poor, which confirms the concerns of regulators. In addition, I also examines factors that affect the bias of SPAC forecasts. The empirical results show that when SPACs are serial sponsors, they have a insignificant impact on the bias of predictions. I also find that the more the optimistic SPAC forecasts, the less accurate the predictions will be.

Blankespoor, E., Hendricks, B. E., Miller, G. S., & Stockbridge D. R. (2022). A Hard Look at SPAC Projections, Management Science, Page 1-12.
Bai, J., Ma, A., & Zheng, M. (2021). Segmented Going-Public Markets and the Demand for SPACs, Available at SSRN 3746490.
Chapman, K., Frankel, R. M., & Martin, X. (2021). SPACs and Forward-Looking Disclosure: Hype or Information, Available at SSRN 3920714.
Chen, G., Firth, M., & Krishnan, G. V. (2001). Earnings forecast errors in IPO prospectuses and their associations with initial stock returns, Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Vol.11, Issue 2, Page 225-240.
Coates, J. (2021). SPACs, IPOs, and Liability Risk Under the Securities Laws, Public Statement, Available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/spacs-ipos-liability-risk-under-securities-laws.
Dambra, M., Even-Tov, O., & George, K. (2021). Should SPAC Forecasts be Sacked, Available at SSRN 3933037.
Damodaran, A. (2021). Disrupting the Disruptors? The ‘Going Public Process' in Transition, working Paper.
Gahng, M., Ritter, J. R., & Zhang, D. (2021). SPACs, working paper, Available at SSRN 3775847.
Gensler, G. (2021). Remarks Before the Healthy Markets Association Conference, Public Speech, Available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-healthy-markets-association-conference-120921.
Hale, L. M. (2006). SPAC: A Financing Tool with Something for Everyone, Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance, Vol.18, Pages 67-74.
Johnson, M. F., Kasznik ,R., & Nelson, K. K. (2000). Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Available at SSRN 229389.
Kolb, J., Tykvová, T. (2016). Going public via special purpose acquisition companies: Frogs do not turn into princes, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.40, Pages 80-96.
Lakicevic, M., Vulanovic, M. (2013). A Story on SPACs, Managerial Finance, Vol.39, Issue 4, Pages 384-403.
Lee, A. H. (2022). Statement on the Proposal to Enhance Investor Protections in SPACs, Public Speech, Available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-statement-spac-proposal-033022.
Mnif, A. (2010). Corporate Governance and Management Earnings Forecast Quality: Evidence From French IPOs, Available at halshs-00459171.