本文將內生經濟成長模型與逃漏稅結合，並依據現存文獻的看法，因地下經濟較地上經濟易於逃漏稅，故勞動者會有誘因從事地下經濟活動，因此本研究將勞動者從事地下經濟的行為視為逃漏稅，其中，地下經濟的報酬即為代表性個人在經濟體系中隱匿所得的部分。模型也考量金融雙元體系的存在，以探討在不同的金融發展程度下，政府應採取的逃漏稅最適稽查政策。代表性個人可以透過地上及地下經濟活動的投入，賺取不同的報酬，並可藉由地上金融部門儲蓄以累積資本。另外，政府可透過逃漏稅稽查政策以影響代表性個人投入於地下經濟活動的時間比例(即逃漏稅比例)，並進一步影響地上經濟的勞動市場均衡。透過本研究的數值模擬，可發現對於金融發展程度較低的國家而言，政府應採取較寬鬆的逃漏稅稽查政策，允許經濟體系存在較嚴重的逃漏稅及較大規模的地下經濟部門。相對地，對於金融發展程度較高的國家而言，政府應採取較嚴峻的查稅政策，故經濟體系存在較輕微的逃漏稅及較小規模的地下經濟部門。本研究也進行了比較靜態分析。

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