企業經營層為了穩固控制權與延續經營權，經常透過特定股權結構強化其控制力。這些安排雖有助於鞏固控制權，卻可能因資訊不對稱與代理問題而影響企業經營風險及外部投資人與債權人對企業風險之評估，進而影響企業的信用風險評等。因此，本研究以2019年至2023年臺灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，並以TCRI作為企業信用風險之代理變數，分析企業門檻持股比例、交叉持股比例與金字塔結構是否與企業信用風險存在關聯性。
實證結果顯示，企業門檻持股比例與信用風險呈現負向顯著關聯性，金字塔結構與企業信用風險呈現正向顯著關聯性，企業交叉持股比例雖與信用風險呈正向關聯性，惟未達顯著水準。

To consolidate control and continue to operate, the management often strengthen their control through a specific ownership structure. Although these arrangements help solidify corporate control, they may induce information asymmetry and agency problems, which in turn may influence how investors and creditors assess a firm's risk, and ultimately affect its credit risk rating. Using a sample of Taiwan's listed companies from 2019 to 2023, this study investigates whether threshold shareholding, cross-shareholding, and pyramid structures are associated with corporate credit risk.
The empirical results show that there is a negative and significant correlation between threshold shareholding and credit risk, and pyramid structure is positively correlated with corporate credit risk. Although there is a positive association between cross-shareholding and credit risk, it is not statistically significant.

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