借款公司與銀行間彼此往來關係以及議價能力是否是決定聯合貸款契約中依績效調整利率條款內容的重要因素?
本研究嘗試利用1993至2010美國聯貸案之資料來檢視此一關係是否確實存在。
實證結果發現，當借款公司與銀行已有往來關係且公司之籌資選擇較少時，會比較傾向簽訂利率向上調整之績效條款。此外，由於單一主辦行於聯貸案中無法向借款公司剝削所有利益，因此對於已和借款公司有往來關係的主辦行來說，其較不傾向簽訂利率向上之調整績效條款。最後，本研究發現，對於主辦行排名較後面的銀行來說，其更傾向簽訂利率向下之調整績效條款來吸引客戶(借款公司)。

It is shown in this thesis that long-term banking relationships and bargaining power are important determinants of performance-pricing covenants (PPC) inclusions in syndicated loan contracts. Using a large sample of syndicated loans data (1993-2010), I find that syndicated loans tend to include more interest-increasing PPC when a long-term banking relationship exists and when borrowers have fewer financing alternatives. The presence of banking relationship with lead arrangers reduces the odds of using interest-increasing PPC, because lead arrangers might not be able to capture all rents from holding-up borrowers. Finally, I find lenders with lower league table ranking are likely to use more interest-decreasing PPC to attract borrowers, which again is consistent with the hold-up hypothesis.

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