本文延續Nielsen, Raimondos-M□ller and Schjelderup (2003)一文所設立的兩國模型，來探討在會計分割法 (separate accounting)與公式化分配法 (formula apportionment)等兩種會計制度下，跨國企業與地主國政府使用單邊預先訂價協議時，對移轉價格之訂定與其所產生的效果。由結果得知，不論是採用哪種訂價方法，在預先訂價協議之下，所得到的移轉價格均會受到「談判力效果」、「稅負誘發效果」與「策略性效果」的影響，其中「談判力效果」是預先訂價協議模型的特色，當「談判力效果」為正值，代表提高移轉價格將使地主國的社會福利增加，反之當「談判力效果」為負值，則提高移轉價格將使地主國的社會福利下降。
此外，跨國企業與地主國政府哪一方的談判力愈高，愈可以訂定對其有利的移轉價格。當地主國政府完全沒有談判能力時，跨國企業對於移轉價格有絕對的決定權，則利用預先訂價協議所決定的移轉價格會與Nielsen, Raimondos-M□ller and Schjelderup (2003)一文所得出的結論相同，亦即「談判力效果」為零。
而在預先訂價協議的應用上，跨國企業方面，因為跨國企業藉由犧牲部分利潤，以換取稅負的穩定，所以其利潤在使用預先訂價協議時會比較小。而地主國政府只要擁有部分的談判力，其社會福利在使用預先訂價協議時會比較大。由此可知「預先訂價協議」是一種對雙方都有利的談判。

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