奎因 (W. V. Quine)的「翻譯的不確定說」(indeterminacy of tran-

slation)，不僅在他自己的哲學體系中佔有重要的地位，在當代分析哲學

中也是一個非常重要的理論。「翻譯的不確定說」不僅主張，我們翻譯另

一個語言時，會有翻譯上的不確定性；而且主張，對鄰居語言的翻譯，也

會有不確定的情形；甚至，它也主張，在第一人稱中，我使用的語言所指

涉的東西到底是什麼，仍是不可確定的。本文的目的，是想追究兩個問題

：第一，奎因以什麼策略或理論論證出「翻譯的不確定說」？第二，「翻

譯的不確定說」可以合理地適用於什麼範圍？關於第一個問題，本文將從

Word and Object 第二章中，奎因所提的「徹底翻譯」(Radical

Translation) 的概念開始討論，因為「翻譯的不確定說」是從這裡關始

建立的，而且，在「徹底翻譯」的討論中，可以幫助我們更深入地研究奎

因是以什麼理論支持「翻譯的不確定說」。本文第二章就分別討論三種奎

因對「翻譯的不確定說」的論證進路：「整體論」、「物理理論的不可限

定說」(underdeterminacy of physical theory)和「字詞指涉的不可測

度說」(Inscrutability of reference of terms ) 。最後，本文認為「

整體論」是其中最強的論證進路。關於第二個問題，本文從奎因的「存有

相對性」 (Ontological rela- tivity) 的觀點開始討論。「存有相對性

」主張，除非相對於背景語言，否則不能說對象語言中字詞指涉的東西是

什麼；而這個存有相對性擴展的程度，就是「翻譯的不確定說」適用的程

度。本文認為，它只能適用於對另一個語言、或對另一個言說者的翻譯上

，並不像奎因所主張的可以適用於第一人稱 (first person) 中、對自己

語言的再詮釋上。本文反對奎因的理由不是基於直覺，而是基於奎因理論

本身的不一致之處，以及基於幾項對第一人稱中翻譯不確定性優缺點的反

省，來反對奎因的這項主張。第一個問題可以幫助我們瞭解第二個問題，

不過它不僅是用來協助我們釐清問題，它本身就是一個需要詳細討論的主

題；第二個問題，也是戴維森 ( Donald Davidson) ，色勒 (John

Searle) ，克爾克(Robert Kirk) 以及方萬全先生所關心的問題，它會涉

及私有語言、語意的公共特質和同一語言的判定等若干哲學問題。對這個

問題，本文的立場和方萬全先生最接近，雖然所持的理由不盡相同。在第

一、二章中，討論的是第一個問題，三、四章中討論的是第二個問題。

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(1) 方萬全，(第一人稱語翻譯的不確定說)，此文於1992年在香港發表，今於香港中文大學付印中