本篇論文探討在高齡社會下，如何透過創新保險商品設計，提高長期照顧保險以及年金保險的銷售。本篇論文包含兩部分，第一部分討論長期照顧保險以及年金保險可能隱含的逆選擇成本，利用台灣地區中老年身心社會生活狀況長期追蹤調查資料，估算不同的健康轉移速率矩陣，並計算可能存在的逆選擇成本。更也進一步探討不同的商品設計，對逆選擇成本的影響。第二部分則探討這兩種商品結合降低逆選擇成本的效果，過去的文獻指出長期照顧保險結合年金保險可以降低長期照顧保險市場的核保問題，以及年金保險市場逆選擇成本過高等問題。不同於過去文獻，本研究討論當兩種商品結合為一新型產品時，在具備同時吸引具有不同個人健康資訊的長期照顧保險被保險人以及年金保險被保險人之特性下，可降低多少逆選擇成本。若降低逆選擇成本的效果夠大，相信這樣子的商品設計能吸引更多被保險人購買，並有助於商業保險市場之成長，提供更多對老年社會經濟的保障。

The thesis focuses on insurance products of long-term care insurance and annuity for the elderly. There are two essays in this thesis. In the first part, we examine relationship between private information of health state and health state transition probability under panel data from the Survey of Health and Living Status of the Elderly in Taiwan (SHLSET). We find the evidence that the individuals self-assessed with good health are considered with relative low risk in the long-term care insurance market but with relative high risk in the annuity market. According to different health state transition probabilities with different private information, we further examine the additional selection cost in annuity products and long-term care insurance. We also go a step further to discuss the effects of the costs on different insurance payment design.
In the second part, we further discuss the product design of Long-term care annuity (LTCA), which provides comprehensive protection for the longevity risk. With the effect of lowering adverse selection cost, LTCA products can provide a cheaper retirement product with higher coverage. In this paper, we explore the consumer benefits and lowering adverse selection cost effect under different product designs of LTCA. LTCA products can attract both annuity and long-term care insurance policyholders because policyholders in the annuities market with relative high risk are with relative low risk in the long-term care insurance market. To estimate the benefits of LTCA product design, we generate three health state models of transition probability matrices: good health, average health and poor health by continuous-time Markov process. Our results show that a good design of LTCA can provide cheaper longevity risk protection with higher coverage than traditional insurance products and thus create a win-win situation for both consumers and insurers.

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