傳統探討商品稅的課徵如雷姆西法則 (Ramsey Rule) 之文獻皆假定商品的消費都可無限細分，卻忽略了一個相當重要的經濟事實－－商品消費的不可分割性。在購買數量非0即1的二元消費體系之下，消費者面對不可分割財僅有買與不買兩種選擇，因此既有消費客群在某些價格範圍內皆會選擇購買，亦即特定的不可分割財稅率區間內，消費者行為不會被扭曲。
除此之外，在所得內生化的假設下，不可分割財的市場因為消費不可分割性導致客群差異化及購買門檻的產生，發生高能力者會購買而低能力者則否的情況，這樣的現象在奢侈品此類不可分割性顯著的商品市場中尤其明顯。此時，相較於傳統無限可細分的財貨的課徵，政府對不可分割財課稅的意義形同課徵差異性定額稅，所得重分配效果比等額定額稅更好。因此，在高能力者願意消費不可分割財的前提下，政府將優先對不可分割財課徵，其餘再課徵其他無限可細分財作為稅源不足的財源替代。
然而在政策決定的過程中，高、低能力者對不可分割財稅率各有偏好的政策訴求：前者希望稅率應該低一點，後者則希望高一點，據此形成組織利益團體的誘因。事實上，利益團體的遊說行為將對政府產生一定的干擾，執政者的目標因而有所偏頗，導致政治失靈的結果。本文將利益團體對執政者提供政治獻金的遊說行為導入包含遊艇此類不可分割性顯著的財貨的商品稅制中，以消費者理論考量政治均衡，在高、低能力者遊說能力懸殊而假設後者無遊說效率的前提下，觀察利益團體參與政治過程之下的商品稅制，研究發現遊說行為導致租稅政策悖離效率均衡，不可分割財的稅率相較於最適稅制下為低、傳統可分割財的稅率則較高，社會福利水準也因遊說干擾而發生效率損失。不僅於此，這樣的情形也將隨著利益團體的遊說效率高漲愈加顯著，表示利益團體的遊說行為使得政治失靈的扭曲現象愈發嚴重。

The assumptions on conventional commodity taxation literature, such as Ramsey Rule, are limited to continuously divisible goods. However, consumption indivisibility indeed exists and as the common fact is incorporated into an otherwise standard two-class economy; there are constraints for consumers subjected to purchase one indivisible good or none. In light of the feature, while indivisible good price is specifically ranged, consumers are willing to pay a higher price after taxation.
Besides, indivisibility of consumption reflects that purchasing constrain differentiates consumers base so that high-wage taxpayers do purchase instead of low-wage taxpayers. Therefore, the commodity tax on indivisible goods acts as differential lump-sum tax, and it enhances income redistribution better than identical lump-sum tax. If we assume more specifically, high-wage taxpayers are the only ones who purchase luxury, which is provided with distinct indivisibility-consumption. The government prefers to tax indivisible goods first, and tax on divisible goods additionally once the tax revenue is more strongly required.
However, high-wage taxpayers have variant tendency towards commodity taxation from low-wage ones since indivisible-good consumption is only affordable for the prior. And this could be the incidence for both to organize interest groups and lobbying; furthermore, the political intervention may not only give impact on misleading tax policies but also lead to government failure. This paper re-examine the commodity taxation with luxury indivisible consumption such like yachts, in setup of political contribution and lobbying. Under the framework, we focus on the interest group belonged to high-wage taxpayers and provide new insights to the literature; first, lobbying achieves inefficient equilibrium on commodity taxation. In comparison with Pareto optimum, the indivisible-good tax rate is lower, while tax on divisible consumption increases and social welfare gets decreased. Moreover, all above are more significant as lobbying efficiency goes higher that result in more serious political failure.

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