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研究生: 陳宜津
Chen, I-Chin
論文名稱: 稅制變革與逃漏稅:臺灣遺贈稅的分析
Tax Reform and Tax Evasion: Evidence from Estate and Gift Taxes of Taiwan
指導教授: 洪福聲
Hung, Fu-Sheng
口試委員: 朱美麗
Chu, Mei-Lie
馮立功
Ferng, Li-Kung
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 社會科學學院 - 行政管理碩士學程
Master for Eminent Public Administrators
論文出版年: 2018
畢業學年度: 106
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 51
中文關鍵詞: 稅率逃漏稅遺產稅贈與稅
外文關鍵詞: Tax rate, Tax evasion, Estate tax, Gift tax
DOI URL: http://doi.org/10.6814/THE.NCCU.MEPA.016.2018.F09
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  • 政府為營造輕稅簡政之賦稅環境、吸引留滯海外資金回流,於2009年1月21日修法公布「遺產及贈與稅法」,將「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」50%最高邊際稅率之累進稅率制度,修正為「10%的單一稅率制度」及提高免稅額。本研究於「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」稅率調降政策施行9年後,租稅誘因的經濟實質效益較為明顯時,透過對「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」理論與實證的探討,檢視「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」稅率調降後,是否能降低民眾租稅規避誘因,提高「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」申報意願,進而使「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」違章漏稅「裁罰案件」占「核定案件」比例減少。
      本研究以「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」稅制改革前後對「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」之違章漏稅「裁罰案件」占「核定件數」比例的變化,並以2004年至2016年為研究期間,使用「主計總處」、財政部所屬五區國稅局的統計數據。透過「EViews」計量經濟軟體建立縱橫多元迴歸模型,進行「實證分析」與「相關統計檢定」。研究結果顯示「遺產稅」稅率調降,對「遺產稅」之違章漏稅「裁罰案件」占「核定件數」比例的變動是顯著的;但「贈與稅」稅率的調降,對贈與稅之違章漏稅「裁罰案件」占「核定件數」比例的影響則不顯著的。


    The government of Taiwan implemented estate and gift tax reform to create a tax-free environment for light taxation and attracting citizens to redirect their overseas investment back to Taiwan. This law amendment was promulgated on January 21, 2009, in which the maximum tax rate in “The Law of Estate and Gift Tax" is reduced from 50% down to 10% and the amount of tax exemption is increased. After 9 years of implementing, the purpose of this thesis is to study whether or not the tax reform has reduced the tax evasion of the corresponding taxes.
    We collected data of 5-district National Tax Bureaus of Taiwan from year 2004 to 2016. Using panel regressions, we find that, in term of estate taxes, the reform successfully reduces tax evasion. However, in terms of gift taxes, the tax reform has no significant effect on tax evasion. We discuss some possible reasonings behind our findings.

    第一章 緒論 1
    第一節 研究背景與動機 1
    第二節 研究目的 2
    第三節 研究方法與架構 3
    第二章 文獻回顧 6
    第一節 逃漏稅相關文獻 6
    第三章 遺產稅及贈與稅現況 10
    第一節 遺產稅及贈與稅的源起 10
    第二節 遺產稅及贈與稅之稅率及免稅額的變革 11
    第三節 資料背景介紹 15
    第四章 實證模型與結果 20
    第一節 計量模型 20
    第二節 遺產稅的實證模型 24
    一、單根檢定 24
    二、各種模型之比較 25
    三、隨機效果模型之結果 26
    第三節 贈與稅的實證模型 29
    一、單根檢定 29
    二、各種模型之比較 30
    三、隨機效果模型之結果 32
    第五章 結論 34
    參考文獻 37
    附錄 40

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