1980年代興起的「策略貿易理論」認為政府應該在貿易中扮演積極主動的角色，透過補貼來造成「利潤轉移效果」，進而提升本國的福利水準。不過，礙於 WTO的規定，政府通常無法對於出口廠商直接進行補貼。除此之外，國際貿易理論大多忽略了逃漏稅行為對於廠商生產決策的影響。本文嘗試將出口補貼的議題以及利潤稅逃漏的問題相結合，探討若政府不得使用補貼，則其是否能夠透過降低查核率，使得本國的福利水準上升。而我們的研究結果發現：允許出口廠商逃漏稅未必皆能攫取外國廠商的利潤，而是依稽核方法而異。當政府採取完全隨機的查核模式時，則政府不需進行稽查。但若政府是對申報收益訂定查核標準時，則我們發現在某些限制條件之下，政府的確可以透過對出口的廠商降低其查核率，使得本國的福利上升，且會使得本國廠商的產量超過 Stackelberg 的領導者的生產水準。最後我們考量兩國政府都使用降低稽核投入的情況下，則策略互動關係會變成一個「囚犯困境」，而且沒有適宜的遏止方法。

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