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| 研究生： |
朱詩閔 Chu, Shih Min |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
貨幣聯盟中最適的財政政策合作 The optimal coordination of fiscal policy in a monetary union |
| 指導教授： |
黃俞寧
Hwang, Yu Ning |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
社會科學學院 - 經濟學系 Department of Economics |
| 論文出版年： | 2011 |
| 畢業學年度： | 99 |
| 語文別： | 英文 |
| 論文頁數： | 33 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | DSGE 、貨幣聯盟 、財政合作 |
| 外文關鍵詞： | DSGE, monetary union, fiscal coordination |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：202 下載：12 |
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本研究目的是在動態隨機一般均衡模型中，討論在貨幣聯盟中，一個中央的財政政府面對衝擊時如何反應。我們根據Gali and Monacelli (2008)的架構並加入一個基金機制來模擬會員國間的財政合作。此基金機制設定為有一中央財政政府向各會員國收取固定的基金費用並將此基金費用全部重新分配給各會員國，故基金在每一期都會結清。在這樣的設定下，聯盟的財政合作和個別國家政府面對波動時的反應相同。
The objective of this paper is to investigate how the central fiscal authority copes with shocks in a monetary union with a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We follow the framework of Gali and Monacelli (2008) and set a fund mechanism to simulate one cast of fiscal coordination among member countries. The central fiscal authority raises the constant fund payment from all member countries and redistributes it to member states, so the budget of the transfer is balanced in each period. Under our design of fund mechanism, we find that this cast of fiscal coordination plays the same rule as the government sector.
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………1
1.1. Motivation…………………………………………………………………..1
1.2. Literature review……………………………………………………………2
2. The model………………………………………………………………………...4
2.1. Goods market……………………………………………………………….4
2.2. Household…………………………………………………………………...6
2.3. Firm…………………………………………………………………………9
2.3.1. Technology……………………………………………………….9
2.3.2. Price setting……………………………………………………10
2.4. Government and fiscal coordination………………………………………10
3. Equilibrium dynamics…………………………………………………………..12
3.1. Market clearing condition…………………………………………………12
3.2. Inflation dynamics………………………………………………………....14
4. The social planner’s problem…………………………………………………...15
5. The policy tradeoffs in the currency union under sticky prices………………...17
5.1. Union member’s tradeoffs…………………………………………………18
5.2. Union-wide tradeoffs………………………………………………………19
6. The optimal monetary and fiscal policies in the currency union……………….20
7. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………23
Reference……………………………………………………………………………..24
Appendix……………………………………………………………………………..25
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