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| 研究生： |
邱娜瑩 |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
墮胎合乎道德嗎？－由湯姆森觀點論之 The Abortion Controversy: On Thomson’s Defense of Abortion |
| 指導教授： |
鄭光明
Cheng, Kuang Ming |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
文學院 - 哲學系 Department of Philosophy |
| 論文出版年： | 2013 |
| 畢業學年度： | 101 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 58 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 墮胎 、倫理學 、反墮胎 |
| 外文關鍵詞： | Abortion, Ethics, Anti-abortion |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：294 下載：0 |
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墮胎的道德爭議一直是倫理學的重要課題。美國哲學家茱蒂絲．湯姆森在一九七一年發表〈為墮胎辯護〉 一文，這篇論文不但試圖反駁反對墮胎論者的立場，湯姆森藉由著名的小提琴家思想實驗，以女性的身體自主權為基礎論證 墮胎並非是道德上不可被允許的行為。本文研究〈為墮胎辯護〉該文之論點，並探討針對此文的批評爭端，接著藉由反駁對〈為墮胎辯護〉之批評，進一步為〈為墮胎辯護〉一文辯護。最後，本文同意湯姆森之主張：墮胎並非道德上不可被允許之行為；並呼籲人們在道德議題上公平地審視墮胎爭議。
The moral debate on abortion has been a hot issue in Ethics. In 1971, American philosopher Judith Javis Thomson launched her famous thesis ‘A Defense of Abortion’ in which she argued against anti-abortionists. By the violinist thought experiment, she began with women’s bodily autonomy as her basic argument and claimed that abortion is not morally impermissible. My thesis here studied Thomson’s view on abortion and discussed the critics that ‘A Defense of Abortion’ evoked. Furthermore, I try to fight back those critics and defense for “A Defense of Abortion.” Finally, this thesis agrees Thomson’s claim: Abortion is not morally impermissible, and suggest that we should fairly examine the debate on abortion.
第一章、緒論 1
第一節、墮胎議題之重要性 1
第二節、研究動機 6
第三節、文獻探討 8
第四節、章節架構 9
第二章、由〈為墮胎辯護〉一文論湯姆森的墮胎權 10
第一節、一般反對墮胎者之論證 10
第二節、反對墮胎不該有例外 17
第三節、論避孕失敗下墮胎 18
第四節、道德上不得體（morally indecent） 19
第五節、本章小結 21
第三章、「為墮胎辯護」一文面對之疑難 23
第一節、小提琴家思想實驗是一個錯誤類比 23
第二節、反墮胎的責任論證（Responsibility Objection） 25
第三節、威脅論證與救生艇論證 29
第四節、墮胎永遠是道德上可允許的嗎？ 33
第五節、本章小結 33
第四章、為湯姆森的「為墮胎辯護」一文辯護 36
第一節、反駁錯誤類比 36
第二節、反駁責任論證 37
第三節、反駁威脅論證與救生艇論證 44
第四節、反駁「墮胎是道德上不可允許的」 46
第五節、本章小結 49
第五章、結論 51
第一節、墮胎是捍衛身體自主權 51
第二節、墮胎是道德上可被允許的嗎？ 53
參考文獻 58
Baer, J. (1999). Our lives before the law: constructing a feminist jurisprudence. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Beckwith, F. (1994). Arguments from the Bodily Rights: A Critical Analysis. In Pojman and Beckwith, eds. (1998). The Abortion Controversy: A Reader (pp. 132–150). London: Jones and Bartlett Publishers.
Boonin-Vail, D. (1997). A Defense of “A Defense of Abortion”: On the Responsibility Objection to Thomson’s Argument. Ethics, 107, 2: 286-313.
Brody, B. (1971). Abortion and the Law. The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 12: 357-369
Brody, B. (1972). The Morality of Abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1, 3: 335-340.
Langer, R. (1992). Abortion and the Right to Privacy. Journal of Social Philosophy, 23, 2: 23-51.
Noonan, J. (1994). Abortion Is Morally Wrong. In Pojman and Beckwith, eds. (1998).The Abortion Controversy: A Reader. London: Jones and Bartlett Publishers. Thomson, J. (1971). A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1, 1: 47-66
Tooley, M. (1984). In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide. In Joel Feinberg eds. (1986). The Problem of Abortion. Belmont：Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Warren M. (1973) On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion. In Beauchamp and Walters, ed. Reprinted in Dwyer and Feinberg, eds. (1993). The Problem of Abortion. (pp. 59–74).
Watkins, M. (2006). Re-reading Thomson: Thomson’s Unanswered Challenge. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 20, 4: 41-59.
Wilcox, J. (1989). Nature as Demonic in Thomson's Defense of Abortion. The New Scholasticism, 63, 4: 463-484
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