本研究探討 CEO 在財報電話會議中的語言具體性，是否會影響分析師對公司未來表現的判斷更新，並進一步檢驗此效果是否會隨下行風險情境而改變。基於資本市場中的資訊不對稱，本研究主張，分析師作為專業資訊中介者，其預測修正比股價反應更能反映外部受眾對管理者訊息的近端判斷更新。研究認為，具體語言可透過降低資訊處理成本、提升轉譯效率，以及滿足分析師對高品質訊息的需求，進而影響分析師對管理者揭露的吸收。研究以 2006 至 2023 年間 S&P 500 公司財報電話會議逐字稿為文本資料，整合 COMPUSTAT、CRSP 與 I/B/E/S 資料庫，最終形成 118 家公司、2,171 筆公司季度觀察值，並採用迴歸進行分析。結果顯示，CEO 語言具體性對分析師預測修正具有穩定且顯著的正向影響。盈餘驚奇的調節效果未達顯著，但財務風險具有顯著調節效果，且方向與原假說相反，亦即當公司財務風險愈高時，語言具體性的正向效果反而減弱。整體而言，本研究證實語言具體性具有實質資訊效果，但其有效性取決於公司所處的風險情境。研究結果補充了公司揭露與分析師行為文獻，並對投資人溝通策略提供實務啟示。

This study examines whether the concreteness of CEO language in earnings conference calls affects analysts’ updated judgments about firms’ future performance, and further tests whether this effect varies across downside-risk contexts. Based on information asymmetry in capital markets, this study argues that analysts, as professional information intermediaries, provide a more proximal indicator of outside audiences’ judgment updating toward managerial messages than stock price reactions. The study proposes that concrete language can influence analysts’ absorption of managerial disclosure by reducing information processing costs, improving translation efficiency, and satisfying analysts’ demand for high-quality information. Using earnings conference call transcripts of S&P 500 firms from 2006 to 2023 as text data, and integrating COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and I/B/E/S databases, the study constructs a final sample of 118 firms and 2,171 firm-quarter observations, and employs panel regression for empirical analysis. The results show that CEO language concreteness has a stable and significant positive effect on analyst forecast revision. The moderating effect of earnings surprise is not significant, whereas financial risk shows a significant moderating effect in the opposite direction from the original hypothesis. Specifically, as a firm’s financial risk increases, the positive effect of language concreteness becomes weaker. Overall, this study confirms that language concreteness has real informational effects, but that its effectiveness depends on the firm’s risk context. The findings contribute to the literature on corporate disclosure and analyst behavior, and offer practical implications for investor relations communication strategies.

Ali, A., Liu, M., Xu, D., & Yao, T. (2019). Corporate disclosure, analyst forecast dispersion, and stock returns. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 34(1), 54–73.
Baik, B., Farber, D. B., & Lee, S. (2011). CEO ability and management earnings forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(5), 1645–1668.
Bissessur, S. W., & Veenman, D. (2016). Analyst information precision and small earnings surprises. Review of Accounting Studies, 21, 1327–1360.
Bolino, M. C., Kacmar, K. M., Turnley, W. H., & Gilstrap, J. B. (2008). A multi-level review of impression management motives and behaviors. Journal of Management, 34(6), 1080–1109.
Bushee, B. J., Gow, I. D., & Taylor, D. J. (2018). Linguistic complexity in firm disclosures: Obfuscation or information? Journal of Accounting Research, 56(1), 85–121.
Bushee, B. J., & Huang, Y. (2024). Do analysts and investors efficiently respond to managerial linguistic complexity during conference calls? The Accounting Review, 99(4), 143–168.
Chen, S., Matsumoto, D., & Rajgopal, S. (2011). Is silence golden? An empirical analysis of firms that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51, 134–150.
Cook, A., Esplin, A., Glass, C., Judd, J. S., & Olsen, K. (2025). Management forecasts and reactions by analysts and investors: The effect of CEO gender. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 52, 1840–1867.
Flake, J. (2025). To interact or not? On the benefits of interacting with unfavorable analysts during earnings calls.
Gleason, C. A., & Lee, C. M. C. (2003). Analyst forecast revisions and market price discovery. The Accounting Review, 78(1), 193–225.
Ham, C., Piorkowski, M., Seybert, N., & Wang, S. (2025). CFO narcissism and the power of persuasion over analysts: A mixed-methods approach. Review of Accounting Studies, 30, 2419–2467.
Hansen, J., & Wänke, M. (2010). Truth from language and truth from fit: The impact of linguistic concreteness and level of construal on subjective truth. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(11), 1576–1588.
Kimbrough, M. D. (2005). The effect of conference calls on analyst and market underreaction to earnings announcements. The Accounting Review, 80(1), 189–219.
Larrimore, L., Jiang, L., Larrimore, J., Markowitz, D., & Gorski, S. (2011). Peer to peer lending: The relationship between language features, trustworthiness, and persuasion success. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 39(1), 19–37.
Mamatzakis, E., & Bagntasarian, A. (2021). The nexus between CEO incentives and analysts’ earnings forecasts. International Journal of Finance & Economics, 26, 6205–6248.
Pan, L., McNamara, G., Lee, J. J., Haleblian, J. J., & Devers, C. E. (2018). Give it to us straight (most of the time): Top managers’ use of concrete language and its effect on investor reactions. Strategic Management Journal, 39(8), 2204–2225.
Skarlicki, D., Lo, K., Rogo, R., Avolio, B. J., & DeHaas, C. A. (2023). The role of CEO accounts and perceived integrity in analysts’ forecasts. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 176, 104250.
Suslava, K. (2021). “Stiff business headwinds and uncharted economic waters”: The use of euphemisms in earnings conference calls. Management Science. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3826