美中科技戰已深刻重塑全球半導體供應鏈，並將半導體提升至關鍵戰略資產的
地位。在武器化相互依賴的理論架構下，本研究探討台灣積體電路製造公司（台積電）因應美國 2022 年《晶片與科學法案》之戰略行為調整。具體而言，本研究檢視該法案之「國家安全護欄」建制如何制約台積電在海外市場的擴張，特別是其位於亞利桑那州鳳凰城的晶圓製造布局。

本研究取得幾項關鍵且強而有力的發現。首先，研究證實美國政府成功將其在
全球技術網絡關鍵節點中的結構性權力轉化為地緣政治槓桿，迫使台積電將國家安全成本內化至其商業營運中，進而限制了其戰略自主權。其次，透過對 2020 年至 2023 年台積電 Form 20-F 年度報告、季度法人說明會逐字稿以及美國聯邦遊說披露報告的縝密分析，研究顯示台積電並非僅是被動服從美國的指令。相反地，該企業積極採取企業政治策略，利用提交公眾意見書與政治遊說，針對嚴苛的法規機制進行議價，其中包含財政部擬議法規中的「禁止雙重獲益」條款。透過這些機制，台積電試圖極大化政府補貼，並在面臨非市場性營運風險時，保障其立即性的資本循環。
最終，本論文論證，全球「去風險」趨勢並未消除供應鏈的脆弱性，而是將地
緣政治風險直接重新分配到台積電的財務與營運結構上，並重塑了台海兩岸的地緣經濟平衡。

The technology war between the United States and China has profoundly reshaped the global semiconductor supply chain, elevating semi-conductors to the status of critical strategic assets. Under the framework of weaponized interdependence, this study investigates the
strategic behavioral adjustments of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) in response to the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. Specifically, it examines how the Act’s National Security Guardrails framework constrains TSMC’s expansion in foreign markets,particularly its factory in Phoenix, Arizona.

This study yields several pivotal and powerful findings. First, it demonstrates that the U.S. successfully translated its structural power at key nodes of the global technology network into geopolitical leverage, forcing TSMC to internalize state security costs into its commercial
operations, thereby limiting its strategic autonomy. Second, through a meticulous analysis of TSMC’s Form 20-F annual reports, quarterly earnings call transcripts, and federal lobbying disclosure reports from 2020 to 2023, this research reveals that TSMC did not merely comply
with American mandates. Instead, the firm actively engaged in corporate political strategies, leveraging public comments and political lobbying to bargain over stringent regulatory mechanisms, such as the "denial of double benefit" rules under proposed treasury regulations.
Through these mechanisms, TSMC attempted to maximize government subsidies and safeguard its immediate capital recycling against non-market operational risks. Ultimately, this thesis argues that the global "de-risking" trend does not eliminate supply chain vulnerabilities
but rather redistributes geopolitical risks directly onto TSMC's financial and operational structures, reshuffling the geoeconomic balance in the Taiwan Strait.

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