在非營利組織中，由於組織盈虧不是經理人最關係的問題，因而當甄選新人時，要求的條件不同於一般的營利組織，此時，甄選負責人任用的標準，和心目中的動機，將是我們關心的重點。本文探討當非營利組織的聘審主席考量聘用新人時，若心目中對新人存有偏見，或考慮自己在組織中的晉升機會時，前者易造成打壓對組織有利的新人，後者則易造成拔擢實力平凡的新人的現象，本文除將刻畫出聘審主席各種拔擢或打壓的情況，並提出對非營利組織聘任制度的建議，以降低聘審主席主觀決定聘審作業的情況。

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