本研究探討台灣零售槓桿交易市場（如外匯保證金、CFD 契約）在國際金融科技浪潮下的監管困境與本土產業邊緣化現象 。主管機關長期採取以「防禦性思維」為核心的監理策略，透過嚴格限制槓桿倍數與產品種類試圖保護投資人，然研究發現此舉產生了顯著的「政策反效果」。過度的投入限制迫使投資人轉向高槓桿且缺乏法律保障的離岸平台，將原本可控的境內市場風險轉化為不可控的跨境詐騙與交易對手風險 。
本研究運用制度理論、行為財務學（如樂透心態、過度自信）與政策失靈框架，並導入「強制平倉所需價格變動」（PML）邏輯進行結構性診斷 。研究結果顯示現行模式存在三大結構性問題：第一，制度設計陷入「零客訴」的合法性陷阱，長期鎖定改革空間 ；第二，缺乏「結果保障」（NBP）機制，導致投資人於極端行情下面臨無限負債風險 ；第三，防禦性限制與投資人行為偏差交互作用，形成將風險向境外真空地帶推送的「風險加速器」 。
研究建議主管機關應由「投入限制」轉向「結果導向監理」，建立具備韌性的風險治理架構 ：導入負餘額保護（NBP）以確保損失可控、建立適宜的專業客戶分級制度以引導資金回流、並同步加快商品開放以提升市場效率 。透過從「限制思維」轉向「引導思維」，重建本土市場競爭力並降低跨境風險外溢 。

This study examines the regulatory dilemmas and market marginalization of Taiwan’s retail leveraged trading sector. Taiwan’s long-standing defensive regulatory approach—characterized by strict leverage limits and product restrictions—has generated notable policy countereffects. Rather than containing risk within the domestic market, these input-based constraints have encouraged trading activity to shift toward offshore platforms with weaker oversight, thereby increasing exposure to cross-border counterparty and fraud risks.
Drawing on institutional theory and behavioral finance, including lottery-like preferences and overconfidence, this research adopts a structural analytical perspective and applies the concept of Price Move to Liquidation (PML) to assess regulatory outcomes. The analysis identifies three interrelated systemic issues: a legitimacy-driven emphasis on complaint avoidance that constrains regulatory reform, the absence of Negative Balance Protection (NBP) that leaves investors exposed to unbounded losses under extreme market conditions, and a risk-amplification dynamic in which defensive regulation displaces trading activity into regulatory vacuums.
Based on these findings, the study argues that Taiwan’s leveraged trading regulation would benefit from a shift from input-based restrictions toward an outcome-oriented framework. It proposes a three-pillar policy direction comprising the introduction of mandatory NBP, the establishment of an appropriate professional client classification regime, and a gradual expansion of permissible products. Such an approach may enhance market resilience, improve investor protection, and reduce the spillover of cross-border financial risks.

一、國際市場規模與交易量（BIS）
1.Bank for International Settlements. (2019). Triennial Central Bank Survey: Global Foreign Exchange Market Turnover. BIS. https://www.bis.org/statistics/rpfx19.htm
2.Bank for International Settlements. (2022). Triennial Central Bank Survey: Global Foreign Exchange Market Turnover. BIS. https://www.bis.org/statistics/rpfx22.htm

二、歐盟監管、去槓桿與負餘額保護（ESMA / FCA）
3.European Securities and Markets Authority. (2018). Decision (EU) 2018/796: Product Intervention Measures Relating to Contracts for Difference. ESMA. https://www.esma.europa.eu/publications-and-statistics/publications
4.European Securities and Markets Authority. (2019). Report on the Impact of the Product Intervention Measures on CFDs. ESMA. https://www.esma.europa.eu/publications-and-statistics/reports
5.European Securities and Markets Authority. (2020). ESMA Annual Statistical Report on EU Securities Markets. ESMA. https://www.esma.europa.eu/publications-and-statistics/statistics
6.Financial Conduct Authority. (2017). Contract for differences. FCA. Retrieved from https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/contract-for-differences

三、澳洲引導式監管（ASIC）
7.Australian Securities and Investments Commission. (2022). Report 724: Response to submissions on CP 348 Extension of the CFD product intervention order. ASIC. https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-724-response-to-submissions-on-cp-348-extension-of-the-cfd-product-intervention-order/
8.Australian Securities and Investments Commission. (2021). Product Intervention Order – Contracts for Difference. ASIC. https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/instruments/asic-product-intervention-order-contracts-for-difference/

四、專業客戶分級制度（歐盟法制）
9.European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2014). Directive 2014/65/EU on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID II). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0065
10.European Commission. (2017). Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32017R0565

五、行為財務學：樂透心態、過度自信、處置效應
11.Barberis, N., & Huang, M. (2008). Stocks as lotteries: The implications of probability weighting for security prices. American Economic Review, 98(5), 2066–2100. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.5.2066
12.Kumar, A. (2009). Who gambles in the stock market? Journal of Finance, 64(4), 1889–1933. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01483.x
13.Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2001). Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence, and common stock investment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 261–292. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301556361
14.Shefrin, H., & Statman, M. (1985). The disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too long. Journal of Finance, 40(3), 777–790. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05002.x

六、台灣市場資料
15.台灣證券交易所。《證券市場統計年報》（近年期）。https://www.twse.com.tw/zh/page/statistics/statistics.html

16.櫃買中心。《櫃買市場交易概況統計資料》（近年期）。https://www.tpex.org.tw/zh-tw/derivative/tpex-derivative/statistics/td/year.html

七、制度理論、政策反效果與治理分析
17.North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press.
18.Merton, R. K. (1936). The unanticipated consequences of purposive social action. American Sociological Review, 1(6), 894–904.
19.Howlett, M. (2019). Designing Public Policies: Principles and Instruments. Routledge.