地緣經濟學探討一國如何運用經濟手段，達成國家安全利益與戰略目標。近年來，關稅戰、金融制裁、科技管制與供應鏈重組等現象，顯示傳統經濟學以效率、成本與比較利益為核心的分析框架，已難以充分解釋國際經濟關係中受到國家安全與戰略競爭影響的現象。經濟連結雖然仍是創造財富的重要基礎，但也形成依賴關係與脆弱性。當國際地緣衝突升高時，國家便可能透過經濟連結的運用，推動整合與競爭、對抗與強制，及防禦與自主等策略，用以擴大自身影響力、改變其他國家行為，或降低對外部經濟體系的依賴。
地緣經濟學的核心意義，不只是分析工具的轉換，而是全球經濟治理邏輯的重塑。傳統經濟學重視效率、成本與互利交換，地緣經濟學則揭示經濟活動如何嵌入國家安全、大國博弈與相對收益之中。換言之，經濟手段不只是促進經濟成長的政策工具，也成為國家生存、競爭與重塑國際權力關係的工具。關稅、出口管制、技術限制、產業補貼、金融制裁、投資篩選與資產凍結等，皆可能轉化為控制關鍵資源、金融網絡與供應鏈的戰略工具。
地緣經濟政策效果不能只以對手是否屈服來判斷，而應從政策目標、執行成本、目標國承受能力、規避管道與國際政治效果等面向予以評估。隨著安全考量進入貿易、金融、科技與投資領域，政府與企業皆須在安全與效率之間調整策略。半導體先進製程形成的「矽盾」，使臺灣成為全球供應鏈與大國競爭中的關鍵節點，但也使臺灣面臨供應鏈重組、兩岸衝突與美中競爭下的地緣經濟風險。準此，臺灣未來的核心課題，並非只是維持產業競爭力，而是如何降低依賴脆弱性、維持自身不可替代性，並建立可信賴供應鏈與地緣經濟防火牆。

Geoeconomics examines how a state uses economic means to achieve national security interests and strategic objectives. In recent years, tariff wars, financial sanctions, technology controls, and supply chain restructuring have shown that the analytical framework of traditional economics, which centers on efficiency, costs, and comparative advantage, is no longer sufficient to fully explain international economic relations shaped by national security and strategic competition. Although economic connectivity remains an important foundation for wealth creation, it also generates relations of dependence and vulnerability. When international geopolitical conflicts intensify, states may use economic connectivity to advance strategies of integration and competition, confrontation and coercion, and defense and autonomy, thereby expanding their influence, altering the behavior of other states, or reducing their dependence on the external economic system.
The core significance of geoeconomics lies not merely in a shift of analytical tools, but in the reshaping of the logic of global economic governance. Traditional economics emphasizes efficiency, costs, and mutually beneficial exchange, whereas geoeconomics reveals how economic activities are embedded in national security, great-power competition, and relative gains. In other words, economic means are not only policy tools for promoting economic growth, but also instruments for national survival, competition, and the reshaping of international power relations. Tariffs, export controls, technology restrictions, industrial subsidies, financial sanctions, investment screening, and asset freezes may all be transformed into strategic tools for controlling critical resources, financial networks, and supply chains.
The effects of geoeconomic policies should not be judged solely by whether the opponent submits. Rather, they should be assessed in terms of policy objectives, implementation costs, the target state’s capacity to withstand pressure, evasion channels, and international political effects. As security considerations increasingly enter the fields of trade, finance, technology, and investment, both governments and firms must adjust their strategies between security and efficiency. The “silicon shield” formed by Taiwan’s advanced semiconductor manufacturing processes has made Taiwan a critical node in global supply chains and great-power competition, but it has also exposed Taiwan to geoeconomic risks arising from supply chain restructuring, cross-strait conflict, and U.S.-China competition. Accordingly, Taiwan’s future core task is not merely to maintain industrial competitiveness, but to reduce its dependence-related vulnerabilities, preserve its strategic indispensability, and establish trusted supply chains and a geoeconomic firewall.

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