自Isaiah Berlin於上世紀中葉重申消極自由與積極自由之區分以來，我們如今對於自由問題的討論仍多以其爲出發點。儘管其自由理論因其内在的模糊和混亂招致諸多批評，但在如今價值多元幾成普遍共識的大背景下，Berlin對於消極自由的青睞可説已形塑了我們對於自由的主流理解。與此同時，積極自由和共和主義自由的支持者們又强烈質疑消極自由的基礎性和優先性，認爲消極自由不能代表自由之真義。針對這種持續的論爭，本論文將從Berlin自由理論、尤其是其偏重的消極自由所遭受的批判出發，嘗試重新梳理建構Berlin的兩種自由框架，提出選擇自由是Berlin自由理論的真正核心，它構成消極自由與積極自由的共同基礎，要求二者分別從免於干預與自我做主兩個維度來保障個體的選擇。唯此，在無法回避多元價值之可能衝突、必須進行抉擇與取捨的生存處境中，個體作爲通過選擇進行自我創造的道德主體，才能不失人之爲人的本質。

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