本文旨在探討隱私權 (right to privacy) 的化約論 (reductionism) 與反化約論 (anti-reductionism) 之爭，前者的代表是Judith Jarvis Thomson (1975)，她主張隱私權可以化約為財產權 (property right)；後者的代表是Samuel D. Warren和 Louis D. Brandeis (1890)，他們主張隱私權是獨立特殊的權利，且不可化約至財產權。
本文將主張Thomson與Warren和 Brandeis的主張看似互斥，實則有共識：兩者的隱私權皆不可化約至狹義財產權 (narrow sense of property right)，而皆可化約為廣義財產權(broad sense of property right)（狹義財產權是指與金錢價值有關的財產權，而廣義財產權是指與金錢價值無關的財產權）。
接著，筆者將主張若隱私權可化約為廣義財產權，則：1. Thomson 主張的隱私權必須由「我的所有物不被看、聽的權利」修正為「為我的所有物創造物理遮蔽的權利」，理由是廣義財產權為「以動作為基礎的權利」(action-based right)，而隱私權也必須一致；且 2. Warren和 Brandeis 的「隱私權是我的訊息不被公開的權利」此一主張則無法言之成理，理由是「我的事實或訊息」不受廣義財產權保障。
此外，筆者將主張 Thomson 的修正版理論將可抵禦 Thomas M. Scanlon (1975) 的「隱私權不可化約為財產權，而是以隱私利益 (privacy interests) 與隱私規約 (privacy norms) 為核心的權利」此一主張的攻擊。
最後，筆者認為本文所得的隱私權理論以及隱私理論，相較於 W. A. Parent (1983) 的隱私狀態說 (condition theory of privacy) 與Richard B. Parker (1974) 的隱私控制說 (control theory of privacy) 更為言之成理，且可為當代的隱私爭論提供解答：筆者主張若隱私權可化約為廣義財產權，則隱私權不保障「我的訊息或所有物不被看、聽、知道、公開的權利」，只保障「對我的所有物創造物理遮蔽的權利」。

In this paper, I will discuss the debate between reductionism and anti-reductionism on the right to privacy. The former is advocated by Judith Jarvis Thomson (1975), who claims that the right to privacy can be reduced to property right; the latter is advocated by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis (1890), who argue that the right to privacy is an independent and distinct right so that it cannot be reduced to property right.
I argue that Thomson's claim and Warren and Brandeis' claim seem to be conflict to each other, but in fact there is a consensus: both believe that privacy right cannot be reduced to the narrow sense of property right, and both agree that privacy right can be reduced to the broad sense of property right (the narrow sense of property right is the property right related to monetary value, while the broad sense of property right is the property right that has nothing to do with monetary value).
Next, I argue that if the right to privacy can be reduced to the broad sense of property right, it follows that the right to privacy advocated by Thomson must be revised from the right not to be looked at or listened to to the right to create physical barriers for my belongings. The reason is that the broad sense of property right is an action-based right, so is the right to privacy. It also follows that privacy is the right to keep my information from being published, which Warren and Brandeis claim, cannot be justified because my facts or information are not protected by the broad sense of property right.
Also, I will argue that Thomson's revised version of the theory of privacy will survive facing Thomas M. Scanlon's claim that the right to privacy, a distinct right based on privacy interests and privacy norms, cannot be reduced to property right.
Finally, I maintain that my theory of privacy right is more robust than W. A. Parent's condition theory of privacy and Richard B. Parker's control theory of privacy, and I believe that my theory of privacy right can provide satisfactory solutions to contemporary privacy debates: I argue that if the right to privacy can be reduced to the broad sense of property right, then the right to privacy does not protect that my information or belongings will not be looked at, listened to, known, or made public, but only protect the right to create physical barriers for my belongings.

林怡仲 (2022)。〈隱私的規範理論：隱私的化約論〉，《華文哲學百科》（2022 版本），王一奇（編）。
林怡仲 (2022a)。〈隱私的規範理論：隱私的反化約論〉，《華文哲學百科》（2022 版本），王一奇（編）。
Allen, Anita. (1987). Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
Allen, Anita. (2011). Unpopular Privacy: What Must We Hide? Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Baker, C. Edwin. (2004). Autonomy and Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The Central Meaning of the First Amendment. Social Philosophy and Policy, 215-268.
Beardsley, Elizabeth. (1971). Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure. In J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds.), NOMOS XIII: Privacy (pp. 56-71). New York, NY: Atherton Press.
Blaauw, M. J. (2013). The Epistemic Account of Privacy. Episteme, 10, 2: 167–177.
DeCew, Judith Wagner. (1997). Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Feinberg, Joel. (1973). Social Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Fried, Charles. (1968). Privacy. Yale Law Journal, 77: 475-93.
Fried, Charles. (1970). An Anatomy of Values. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gavison, Ruth. (1980). Privacy and the Limits of Law. Yale Law Journal, 89: 421-71.
Gerety, Tom. (1977). Redefining Privacy. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 12: 233-93.
Gross, Hyman. (1971) Privacy and Autonomy. In J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds.), NOMOS XIII: Privacy (pp. 169-81). New York, NY: Atherton Press.
Hettinger, Edwin C. (1989). Justifying Intellectual Property. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18, 1: 31-52.
van den Haag, Ernest. (1971). On Privacy. In J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds.), NOMOS XIII: Privacy (pp. 149-168). New York, NY: Atherton Press.
van den Hoven, J. (1999). Privacy and the Varieties of Informational Wrongdoing. Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics, 1, 1: 30–44.
Inness, Julie. (1992). Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kalven, Harry Jr. (1966). Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? Law and Contemporary Problems, 31: 326-341.
Matheson, David. (2007). Unknowableness and Informational Privacy. Journal of Philosophical Research, 32: 251–67.
Miller, Arthur R. (1971). The Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks, and Dossiers. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Nissenbaum, Helen. (2004). Privacy as Contextual Integrity. Washington Law Review, 79: 101–139.
Nozick, Robert. (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
Parent, W. (1983). Privacy, Morality and the Law. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12: 269-88.
Parent, W. (1983a). Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy. American Philosophical Quarterly, 20, 4: 341-355.
Parker, Richard B. (1974). A Definition of Privacy. Rutgers Law Review, 27: 275-296.
Powers, Madison. (1996). A Cognitive Access Definition of Privacy. Law and Philosophy, 15, 4: 369-386.
Prosser, William. (1960). Privacy. California Law Review, 48: 383-423.
Rachels, J. (1975). Why Privacy is Important. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4: 323-33.
Rössler, Beate (ed.)(2004). Privacies: Philosophical Evaluations. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Rubel, Alan. (2011). The Particularized Judgment Account of Privacy. Res Publica, 17, 3: 275–90.
Scanlon, T. (1975). Thomson on Privacy. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4: 315-322.
Schoeman, F. (ed.)(1984). Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schoeman, Ferdinand. (1984) Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature. In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 1-33). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Solove, D. (2006). A Taxonomy of Privacy. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 154: 477–564.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. (1975). The Right to Privacy. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4: 295–314. Also in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 272-289). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. (1990). The Realm of Rights. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Tribe, Lawrence. (1978). American Constitutional Law. Mineola, NY: Foundation Press.
Warren, S. and Brandeis, L. (1890). The Right to Privacy. Harvard Law Review, 4: 193-220.
Westin, Alan F. (1967). Privacy and Freedom. New York, NY: Atheneum.