自 2018 年中美貿易戰以來，美國透過關稅、產業補貼、投資限制與出口管制等方式重塑半導體供應鏈，同時，2020年台積電赴美設廠亦代表台灣先進製程產能開始向美國部分延伸。本文旨在探討在中美科技競爭與半導體供應鏈移轉的背景下，台灣半導體業的出口會如何因應調整、全球半導體貿易網絡是否也沿地緣政治陣營分化。
本研究以2015 年至 2024 年間，包括台灣在內的全球 30 個經濟體的產品層級貿易資料為基礎，選取HS8486（半導體設備）、HS8542（積體電路）等產品，將其區分設備資本財（CAPEX）與原物料及營運耗材（OPEX），並以 2022 年 10 月美國商務部工業安全局（Bureau of Industry and Security, BIS）新規和台積電宣布赴美國亞利桑那州設廠作為事件切點，採用 PPML 模型進行實證分析。
實證結果顯示，一，政策後台灣半導體相關產品出口方向呈現相對偏向美國市場的重分配；二，台積電赴美設廠對台灣供應鏈出口的拉動效果主要體現在設備與建廠資本財；三，半導體製造設備較積體電路更容易受到地緣政治陣營化影響。台灣對中國陣營之設備出口相對弱化幅度顯著大於對美國陣營，顯示台灣設備出口方向存在相對偏向美國陣營的非對稱調整；相較之下，積體電路貿易對地緣政治陣營化的反應整體不顯著。

Since the onset of the U.S.–China trade war in 2018, the United States has sought to reshape the semiconductor supply chain through tariffs, industrial subsidies, investment restrictions, and export controls. Meanwhile, TSMC’s decision to establish a fab in the United States in 2020 also signaled that Taiwan’s advanced process manufacturing capacity had begun to partially extend toward the United States. Against the backdrop of U.S.–China technological competition and semiconductor supply chain relocation, this thesis aims to examine how Taiwan’s semiconductor exports have adjusted in response, and whether the global semiconductor trade network has also become fragmented along geopolitical blocs.
This study is based on product-level trade data from 30 economies, including Taiwan, from 2015 to 2024. It focuses on products such as HS 8486, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and HS 8542, integrated circuits, and further distinguishes between capital expenditure goods (CAPEX) and raw materials and operational consumables (OPEX). Taking the new rules issued by the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) in October 2022 and TSMC’s announcement of its Arizona fab investment as event cutoffs, this study conducts empirical analysis using a PPML model.
The empirical results show that, first, after the policy shock, Taiwan’s semiconductor-related exports exhibited a relative reallocation toward the U.S. market. Second, the export-pulling effect of TSMC’s U.S. fab investment on Taiwan’s supply chain exports was mainly reflected in equipment and fab-construction-related capital goods. Third, semiconductor manufacturing equipment was more susceptible to geopolitical bloc formation than integrated circuits. Taiwan’s equipment exports to the China-aligned bloc weakened significantly more than those to the U.S.-aligned bloc, indicating an asymmetric adjustment in Taiwan’s equipment export direction that was relatively tilted toward the U.S.-aligned bloc. By contrast, integrated circuit trade showed no overall significant response to geopolitical bloc formation.

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