簡易檢索 / 詳目顯示
| 研究生： |
余俊慶 Yu, Chung-Ching |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
微分賽局在行銷通路之應用─合作廣告 |
| 指導教授： |
林柏生
Lin, Po-sheng |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
商學院 - 國際經營與貿易學系 Department of International Business |
| 論文出版年： | 2006 |
| 畢業學年度： | 94 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 38 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 行銷通路 、微分賽局 、動態規劃 、合作廣告 |
| 外文關鍵詞： | marketing channel, differential game, dynamic programming, cooperative advertising |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：111 下載：120 |
| 分享至: |
| 查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報 |
在經濟活動發展迅速的情形下，產品的競爭與多樣化使得廠商在價格之外，也須將行銷策略納入考量。研究行銷通路中成員互動的理論模型從靜態模型開始，到用動態微分賽局的模型來研究廠商間的互動，過去的研究文獻得到了兩點結論：第一，通路合作為Pareto最適。第二，在通路無法合作的情況下，利用合作機制的建立，能使均衡結果產生Pareto改善。
然而，過去的文獻卻未說明將通路合作放入合作廣告的模型中，通路合作是否仍為Pareto最適。因此，本研究沿用Jørgensen et al.(2003)合作廣告模型的設定，將通路合作的情況放入模型中，比較通路合作、零售商遠視、零售商短視與合作廣告四種情形均衡時的行銷策略及廠商的利潤，並探討通路合作在合作廣告的模型中是否仍為Pareto最適。
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究動機 1
1.2 研究目的 2
第二章 文獻回顧 4
2.1 通路合作 4
2.2 通路不合作 8
2.2.1 合作廣告 8
2.2.2 領導者模型 11
2.2.3 誘因策略 12
第三章 模型設定 14
第四章 模型求解 16
4.1 通路合作 16
4.2 通路不合作且無合作廣告 18
4.2.1 零售商是遠視的 18
4.2.2 零售商是短視的 21
4.3 合作廣告 23
第五章 均衡結果的比較分析 27
5.1 廠商的均衡行銷策略 27
5.1.1 製造商 27
5.1.2 零售商 28
5.2 廠商的福利水準 29
5.2.1 製造商 29
5.2.2 零售商 30
5.3 通路整體的福利水準 31
第六章 結論 34
6.1 本文結論 34
6.2 未來研究方向 35
參考文獻 36
(1)Blattberg, R.C., Neslin, S.A.(1990), Sales Promotion:Concepts,Methods, and Strategies. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs,NJ.
(2)Chintagunta, P.K., and Jain, D. (1991), “A Study of Manufacturer-Retailer Marketing Strategies: A Differential Game Approach”. In Dynamic Games in Economics,Hamalainen and Ehtamo (Eds). Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, Vol.157, Springer-Verlag.
(3)Chintagunta, P.K., and Jain, D. (1992), “A Dynamic Model of Channel Member Strategies for Marketing Expenditures”, Marketing Science, Vol.11, Iss.2, pp.168–188.
(4)Coughlan, A.T., Anderson, E., Stern, L.W.and A.I. El-Ansary (2001),Marketing Channels,Sixth Edition, Prentice Hall.
(5)Jeuland, A.P. and S. M. Shugan (1983), “Marketing Channel Profits”, Marketing Science, Vol. 2, Iss.3, pp.239-272.
(6)Jørgensen, S., Sigu´e, S. P., and Zaccour, G. (2000), “Dynamic Cooperative Advertising in a Channel”, Journal of Retailing, Vol.76, Iss.1, pp.71–92.
(7) Jørgensen, S., Sigu´e, S. P., and Zaccour, G. (2001a), “Stackelberg Leadership in a Marketing Channel”, International Game Theory Review, Vol.3, Iss.1, pp.13–26.
(8) Jørgensen, S., Taboubi, S., and Zaccour, G. (2001b), “Cooperative Advertising in a Marketing Channel”, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol.110, Iss.1,pp.145–158.
(9) Jørgensen, S., Taboubi, S. and Zaccour, G. (2003), “Retail Promotions with Negative Brand Image Effects: Is Cooperation Possible?”, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol.150, Iss.2, pp.395–405.
(10) Jørgensen, S. and Zaccour, G. (1999), “Equilibrium Pricing and Advertising Strategies in a Marketing Channel”, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol.102,Iss.1, pp.111–125.
(11)Jørgensen, S. and Zaccour, G. (2003a), “A Differential Game of Retailer Promotions”,Automatica, Vol.39, Iss.7, pp.1145–1155.
(12)Jørgensen, S. and Zaccour, G. (2003b), “Channel Coordination over Time: Incentive Equilibria and Credibility”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol.27,pp.801–822.
(13)Kamien, M.I. and Schwarz, N.L. (1991),Dynamic Optimization: the Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control, North Holland, Amsterdam.
(14)McGuire T. and Staelin, R. (1986), “Channel Efficiency, Incentive Compatibility,Transfer Pricing, and Market Structure: An Analysis of Channel Relationships”, Research in Marketing, Vol.8, pp.181–223
(15)Martın-Herran, G.and Taboubi, S.(2003), “Shelf-space Allocation and Advertising Decisions in the Marketing Channel: A Differential Game Approach”, GERAD G-2003-60.
(16) Nerlove, M. and K.J. Arrow.(1962), “Optimal Advertising Policy under Dynamic Conditions.”,Economica,vol.29,pp.129-142.
(17)Reve, T. and Stern, L.W.(1979), “Interorganzational Relations in Marketing Channels”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 4, Iss.3, pp. 405-416.
(18)Stern, L.W.(1969), Distribution Channels：Behavioral Dimensions, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston.
(19)Taboubi, S. and Zaccour, G. (2002), “Impact of Retailer’s Myopia on Channel’s Strategies”, in Optimal Control and Differential Games : Essays in Honor of Steffen Jorgensen, G. Zaccour ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers,pp. 179-192.
(20)Taboubi, S. and Zaccour, G. (2005), “Coordination Mechanisms in Marketing Channels:A Survey of Game Theory Models”, GERAD discussion paper G–2005–36.