隨著行動應用程式商店在全球數位服務產業中的角色日益關鍵，Apple App Store 的治理方式已從單一企業的商業決策，演變為影響整體市場結構的重要公共政策議題。自 2021 年起，美國、英國、澳洲與日本陸續透過不同制度工具對 App Store 的封閉生態提出挑戰。本研究以「制度介入—平台策略回應—產業影響」為核心因果鏈，採用質性比較文件研究法，以 Apple App Store 為核心個案，比較四個司法管轄區在 2021 至 2025 年間的監管制度差異，並以跨邊網絡效應、抽成經濟、用戶轉換成本與開發者依賴四個維度作為共同分析座標。研究發現，四國監管路徑雖整體呈現從事後司法審查向事前立法規範演進的趨勢，但演進速度與深度高度受制於各國競爭法傳統，並非線性收斂。在平台策略層面，Apple 呈現「最小合規、最大保留」的一致性邏輯，透過替代性費率工具、架構設計與商業誘因重組，在制度開放的外觀下持續維繫生態系整合優勢；Epic 案藐視法庭裁定揭示此策略存在司法可執行的邊界。在產業影響層面，監管變化對 SaaS 與訂閱制業者帶來真實但受限的成本改善，第三方支付業者則在替代性手續費框架下面臨費率競爭空間受壓的結構性限制。本研究的核心理論貢獻在於揭示四個維度間相互強化的制度互補性：任一維度的監管干預均可被平台透過其他維度加以補償，此發現支持多維度協同監管策略的必要性，並為台灣數位服務業者與監管機構提供具體的策略參考。

As mobile application stores become critical infrastructure in the digital services industry, Apple App Store governance has evolved into a significant public policy issue. Since 2021, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan have deployed distinct institutional instruments to challenge the App Store’s closed ecosystem. This study employs qualitative comparative documentary research, comparing regulatory differences across four jurisdictions from 2021 to 2025, with four dimensions—cross-side network effects, commission economics, user switching costs, and developer dependence—as analytical coordinates. The findings reveal that while all four regulatory approaches trend toward ex ante regulation, the pace and depth of evolution remain contingent upon each jurisdiction’s competition law tradition. Apple exhibits a consistent logic of minimal compliance and maximal retention, maintaining ecosystem advantages through alternative fee instruments and architectural design; the Epic contempt-of-court ruling reveals the judicially enforceable limits of this approach. Regulatory changes yield genuine but constrained improvements for SaaS and subscription-based providers, while third-party payment providers face structural constraints under Apple’s alternative commission frameworks. The core contribution identifies mutually reinforcing complementarity among the four dimensions: intervention in any single dimension can be offset by platform reinforcement elsewhere, supporting coordinated multi-dimensional regulatory strategies.

中文文獻
Apple（2025）。全球 App Store 協助開發者突破新高。取自 https://www.apple.com/tw/newsroom/2025/06/global-app-store-helps-developers-reach-new-heights/。
CMoney（2024）。蘋果新政策衝擊開發者？App Store 收費爭議全解析。取自 https://www.cmoney.tw/notes/note-detail.aspx?nid=1072935。
iPhoneNews（2025年12月18日）。Apple 計劃在 2026 年增加 App Store 搜尋廣告位。取自 https://iphonenews.cc/2025/12/18/apple-increase-app-store-search-ads-slots-2026/。
TechOrange（2025年12月11日）。Fintech predictions for 2026。取自 https://techorange.com/2025/12/11/fintech-predictions-for-2026/
永豐金證券（2024）。全球平台經濟趨勢分析。取自 https://www.sinotrade.com.tw/richclub/news/694344018ff59b56a6f7362a。
黃惠聆。（2024年12月11日）。2026 上看 4 千億美元 生成式 AI 消費支出年增狂飆。取自 https://tw.stock.yahoo.com/news/2026上看4千億美元-生成式ai消費支出年增狂飆-201000977.html。
彭慧明（2024年12月27日）。Apple 在澳洲敗訴 被迫開放第三方支付。取自 https://udn.com/news/story/7240/9243778。
The Business Research Company, 2026年全球行動應用市場報告（2026年3月）。預計該市場規模將從2025年的3,138.8億美元成長到2026年的3,575.8億美元。取自 https://www.gii.tw/report/tbrc1976030-mobile-application-global-market-report.html。
鉅亨網（2024）。數位平台經濟發展趨勢。取自 https://hao.cnyes.com/post/225570。
聯合新聞網（2024）。App Store 新規定衝擊開發商。取自 https://money.udn.com/money/story/5612/9209216。

英文文獻
Apple Inc. (2021). App Store Review Guidelines (Version as of September 2021). Apple Developer. Available: https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/.
Apple Inc. (2024, January 25). Apple announces changes to iOS, Safari, and the App Store in the European Union [Press release]. Apple Newsroom. Available: https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2024/01/apple-announces-changes-to-ios-safari-and-the-app-store-in-the-european-union/.
Alfonso, S. R., Cole, M. L., Gaither, H. R., & Maddock, R. (2025, May 19). Apple faces severe penalties in Epic v. Apple case for violating injunction and perjury. Perkins Coie. Available: https://perkinscoie.com/insights/update/apple-faces-severe-penalties-epic-v-apple-case-violating-injunction-and-perjury.
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). (2021). Digital platform services inquiry: Interim report No. 2 – App marketplaces. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. Available: https://www.accc.gov.au/about-us/publications/serial-publications/digital-platform-services-inquiry-2020-25-reports/digital-platform-services-inquiry-march-2021-interim-report.
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). (2023). Digital platform services inquiry: Interim report No. 7 – Expanding digital platform ecosystems. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. Available: https://www.accc.gov.au/inquiries-and-consultations/digital-platform-services-inquiry-2020-25/september-2023-interim-report.
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). (2025). Digital platform services inquiry: Final report. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. Available: https://www.accc.gov.au/inquiries-and-consultations/digital-platform-services-inquiry-2020-25.
Barney, J. B. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 17(1), 99–120.
https://doi.org/10.1177/014920639101700108
Boudreau, K. J. (2010). Open platform strategies and innovation: Granting access vs. devolving control. Management Science, 56(10), 1849–1872. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1215
Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. Qualitative Research Journal, 9(2), 27–40. https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77–101.
https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). (2022). Mobile ecosystems: Market study final report. Available: https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/mobile-ecosystems-market-study.
Cowls, J., Morley, J., & Floridi, L. (2023). App store governance: Implications, limitations, and regulatory responses. Telecommunications Policy, 47(1), 102460. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2022.102460
Crémer, J., de Montjoye, Y. A., & Schweitzer, H. (2019). Competition policy for the digital era. European Commission. Available: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf.
Cusumano, M. A., Gawer, A., & Yoffie, D. B. (2019). The Business of Platforms: Strategy in the Age of Digital Competition, Innovation, and Power. Harper Business.
Eisenmann, T. R., Parker, G. G., & Van Alstyne, M. W. (2006). Strategies for two-sided markets. Harvard Business Review, 84(10), 92–101.
Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2021) (Judgment and permanent injunction).
Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 67 F.4th 946 (9th Cir. 2023) (affirming in part and reversing in part the district court judgment on appeal).
Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2025) (Order finding Apple in civil contempt and modifying permanent injunction).
Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 25-2935 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 2025) (affirming finding of civil contempt and upholding permanent injunction with modifications).
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/12/11/25-2935.pdf
European Parliament & Council of the European Union. (2022). Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act). Official Journal of the European Union, L 265, 1–66. Available: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32022R1925.
Furman, J., Coyle, D., Fletcher, A., Marsden, P., & McAuley, D. (2019). Unlocking digital competition: Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel. UK Government. Available: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c9238a2e5274a6a72cf30e5/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf.
Gawer, A. (2014). Bridging differing perspectives on technological platforms: Toward an integrative framework. Research Policy, 43(7), 1239–1249.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.03.006
Hovenkamp, H. (2021). Platforms and the rule of reason: The Epic v. Apple decision. University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online, 170, 47–73.
Ibáñez Colomo, P. (2021). The Digital Markets Act: A translation. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 12(7), 1–13.
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpab061
Jacobides, M. G., Cennamo, C., & Gawer, A. (2018). Towards a theory of ecosystems. Strategic Management Journal, 39(8), 2255–2276. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2904
Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC). (2024). Outline of the Act for Promotion of Competition for Specified Smartphone Software. Available:
https://www.jftc.go.jp/file/240612EN3.pdf
Khan, L. M. (2017). Amazon's antitrust paradox. Yale Law Journal, 126(3), 710–805.
Kwet, M. (2019). Digital colonialism: US empire and the new imperialism in the Global South. Race & Class, 60(4), 3–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396818823172
OECD. (2018). Rethinking antitrust tools for multi-sided platforms. OECD Publishing. Available: https://www.oecd.org/competition/rethinking-antitrust-tools-for-multi-sided-platforms.htm.
OECD. (2022). App stores: Competition and regulation (DAF/COMP(2022)9). OECD Publishing. Available: https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/app-stores-competition-and-regulation-2022.pdf.
Parker, G. G., Van Alstyne, M. W., & Choudary, S. P. (2016). Platform revolution: How networked markets are transforming the economy and how to make them work for you. W. W. Norton & Company.
Rochet, J.-s., & Tirole, J. (2003). Platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2–3), 990–1029.
https://doi.org/10.1162/154247603322493212
Teece, D. J. (2007). Explicating dynamic capabilities: The nature and microfoundations of (sustainable) enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal, 28(13), 1319–1350. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.640
Tiwana, A. (2014). Platform ecosystems: Aligning architecture, governance, and strategy. San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.
Yin, R. K. (2018). Case study research and applications: Deisgn and methods (6th ed.). London: SAGE.

日文文獻
デジタル市場競争会議（内閣官房デジタル市場競争本部事務局）。（2023）モバイル・エコシステムに関する競争評価　最終報告。取自https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/digitalmarket/kyosokaigi/dai7/siryou2s.pdf
一般社団法人新経済連盟（JANE）。（2023）。「モバイル・エコシステムに関する競争評価　最終報告」に関する意見。取自https://jane.or.jp/app/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/5e246e155dbc228ce401e96791b3bdfa.pdf